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 This dissertation examines the effect of founders’ background in shaping alliance 
ties and firm performance of new ventures. In the first chapter, I examine how founders’ 
prior affiliations contribute to the formation of network ties for new ventures founded by 
employee entrepreneurs. Prior research on employee entr preneurship attributes the 
success of new ventures founded by employees (called spinouts) to knowledge 
inheritance from founders’ previous employers (parents). However, studies on new 
venture alliances suggest that the success of new firms stems from establishing strategic 
alliances with other firms. I bridge the gap between these two literatures by examining 
how the knowledge accumulated by the spinout’s founder influences the new venture’s 
alliance partner choice, using a panel data of pharmaceutical and medical device firms 
  
from 1986 to 2012. The findings suggest that a spinout that is similar to its parent in 
terms of technology and product markets is likely to form marketing, manufacturing, or 
funding ties with firms that have no parent ties. Conversely, a spinout that is not similar 
to its parent more likely to form commercialization ties with firms that have indirect ties 
to the parent, as a way to deal with the risk of collab rating with its parent and its 
partners. Finally, a spinout that has different technology but operates in a similar market, 
as its parent is likely to forge commercialization ties with the parent’s partners.  
 In the second chapter, I examine how heterogeneity in the founders’ backgrounds 
affects the start-up’s performance. I examine two types of founder backgrounds: 
employee and academic entrepreneurs. Employee entrepreneurs have relevant industry 
experience due to their founders’ prior affiliation, whereas academically founded firms 
are endowed with research-related resources through their founders’ experience. I use the 
panel data of academic and employee start-ups in the pharmaceutical and medical device 
industry, 1986-2013. I find that academic start-ups have higher research output and 
smaller alliance networks than do employee start-ups. Further, the founders’ background 
has no impact on the start-up’s performance outcome; instead, it shapes the patents and 
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Chapter 1: Casting Shadows: Effect of Parent-Spinout Knowledge 




 One of the central tenets of the literature on spiouts posits that the success of 
new firms founded by employee entrepreneurs is a reult of knowledge inheritance from 
successful parents (Agarwal, Echambadi, Franco, & Sarkar, 2004; Chatterji, 2009). 
Entrepreneurs in high-technology industries face sev re competition, for both their 
technology and in commercialization of their products (Gans & Stern, 2003). The 
literature on new venture alliances suggests that these new firms cope with competition 
by forming alliance ties with other firms to gain access to complementary resources that 
are crucial for their success and performance (Podolny, Stuart, & Hannan, 1996). I bridge 
the gap between these two disconnected literatures by xamining how knowledge 
inheritance from parent firms influences the ability of spinouts to establish network ties 
with other firms. 
 New firms differ in their access to resources and their ability to establish alliances 
ties with other firms. The founding conditions of the start-up determine its ability to learn 
and adapt in a competitive environment (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). Firms founded by 
employee entrepreneurs inherit knowledge their founders learned from their previous 
employers or parent firms. Hence, founders with prior experience in a successful firm are 
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more likely to create successful new ventures (Agarwal et al., 2004). However, the 
competition to survive and succeed in high-technology industries is fierce, with firms 
facing threats to both its technology and market entry. These new firms, even with their 
knowledge endowment through their founder’s experience, continue to need 
complementary resources and use alliance ties to fulfill this need. I define a firm founded 
by an employee entrepreneur as a spinout, whereas the parent firm is the firm that 
employed these founders before creation of the spinout.  
 Employees gain social capital during their employment at their parent firms 
(Roberts & Sterling, 2012), and these networks influence their ability to form network 
ties in the future (Hallen, 2008). The imprint of prior organizational experience on the 
founders shapes their partner choices, especially for a new firm. Moreover, these alliance 
ties are crucial for firm performance because they provide valuable resources, 
information, and status (Davis & Eisenhardt, 2011). However, the literature does not 
extensively address the formation process of these ti  among spinouts. This study 
extends prior studies on partner choice by examining the influence of the founder’s prior 
affiliation on the external relationships established by these new ventures.  
I address two key questions in this study. Do spinouts choose partners from their 
parent network? Moreover, what role does the inheritance of knowledge play in their 
partner choices? I capture a spinout’s knowledge inh ritance from its parent firm as a 
distance measure based on the technology and product markets of the parent and spinout. 
The technological and market distance measures allow me to classify these spinouts into 
four categories. Each spinout weighs its need for complementary resources with the risk 
of collaboration before establishing an inter-organiz tional alliance tie. A spinout enters 
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into a tie with a partner when its resource need outweighs the collaboration risk.  
 I use data on firms in the pharmaceutical and medical evice industry, collected 
using annual additions of Medical Marketplace guides. This data consists of firm, 
business unit, and top-management team data for firms in the pharmaceutical and medical 
device industry from 1986 to 2003. I supplement this data using COMPUSTAT for 
financial information, ventureXpert for funding information, LexisNexis for latest events, 
Corporate Affiliations for product information, Delphion for patent data, and 
ThompsonOne for individual-level data. The resulting unbalanced panel data contains 
network ties and firm- and individual-level data for the entire healthcare industry from 
1986 to 2012. The data allows me to track the formation of ties for both spinout and 
parent firms in the pharmaceutical and medical device industry over time. The results 
show that spinouts with similar technology and markets as their parents will find partners 
with no parent ties to gain access to manufacturing, marketing, or funding resources. 
Conversely, spinouts with different technology operating in different product markets 
from their parents will form commercialization ties with firms that have indirect ties to 
their parents. This suggests spinouts deal with the collaboration risk by avoiding firms 
that have direct ties to their parent firm. Furthermo e, spinouts that enter similar markets 
with different technology than their parents are lik ly to benefit from their parents’ 
networks. These new ventures form commercialization ties with firms that have direct 
ties to the parents, suggesting spinouts can leverage their new technology relative to their 





 A founder’s pre-founding experience has a profound effect on the creation of 
successful spinouts (Agarwal et al., 2004; Gompers, Lerner, & Scharfstein, 2005; 
Klepper, 2007). Spinouts inherit technical, marketing (Agarwal et al., 2004), and 
regulatory know-how from their parent firms (Chatterji, 2009), and the parents’ 
characteristics dictate the spinouts’ product spaces (Phillips, 2002). Occupying similar 
product space as its parent may limit a spinout’s partner choices, implying that 
knowledge inheritance has an important role in the spinout’s formation of alliance 
networks. Therefore, I classify spinouts based on their technological and product market 
distance with respect to their parent firm.  
 Employees learn valuable skills and build social networks through their 
experience in the parent firm (Gompers et al., 2005; Roberts & Sterling, 2012; Semadeni 
& Cannella, 2011). New ventures cooperate to aid commercialization of a product (Gans 
& Stern, 2003) and to gain access to complementary assets. In contrast, incumbents 
cooperate as an alternative to internal development (Rothaermel, 2001) or to control 
competition within the market. A start-up’s network is determined by its founders’ 
previous network connections (Hallen, 2008). Spinouts are an interesting setup to study 
new venture alliances because they allow examinatio of how prior affiliation, captured 
by the spinout’s knowledge inheritance from its parent, affects the formation of alliance 
ties. 
 Founders can leverage their prior knowledge and social capital (accumulated 
during their employment at their parent firm) to access relevant information about 
complementary resources in other incumbents. They also c n learn potential partner 
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behavior while forming their alliance ties. To understand with whom these spinouts 
partner, and if they utilize their parents’ networks, I categorize the partner firms into three 
categories: (1) the parent, or firms that have direct ti s to the parent, called parent direct 
ties; (2) firms that have indirect ties to the parent, called parent indirect ties; and (3) 
firms with no ties to the parent, called no parent ties.  
 
Knowledge Inheritance  
In a high-technology industry, knowledge and access to resources are the key 
success determinants for a new venture. A new ventur ’s superior performance is 
contingent on its ability to formulate a cooperative strategy (Ahuja, 1996) and on 
knowledge inheritance from its parent firm (Agarwal et al., 2004). Network ties serve as 
a source for innovation, resources, and capabilities (Kogut, 1988). These alliance ties 
have a long-lasting influence on the spinout’s performance. However, differences among 
the cooperative strategies employed by the spinouts relate to heterogeneity in the level of 
knowledge inherited from their parents. Therefore, I classify spinouts based on the 
inherited knowledge in both market space and technological space.  
I use market distance and technological distance to measure a spinout’s 
knowledge inherited from its parent firm. Both measure  capture the Euclidean distance 
between two firms based on the technology and product markets in which both firms 
exist. Market distance is defined as the extent to which the products of a spinout differ 
from those of its parent. Product market strategy is at the heart of the firm’s strategy to 
achieve competitive advantage (Makadok & Ross, 2013), and the influence of knowledge 
inheritance extends to the product markets these spinouts enter (Phillips, 2002). 
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Therefore, a spinout’s market choice relative to its parent’s product market affects how it 
shapes its alliance network.  
Technological distance captures the technical knowledge the spinout inherts from 
its parent. I note that not all technical knowledge within firm maps to its products. 
Additionally, a firm might choose to abandon a technological field and just license their 
technology to other firms. Thus, I capture technology with a measure different from 
market distance. If the technological distance is high, then a spinout is in a different 
technological space from its parent’s space. On the o r hand, low technological 
distance implies that the spinout imitates parent firm knowledge. 
Spinout Categories 
 Technological and market distance from the parent may shape the spinout’s 
partner choices.  I start by classifying spinouts in o four categories (Figure 1) based on 
their technological distance and market distance. Spinouts in the first category inherited 
technical knowledge from their parents and chose to en er a product market similar to 
their parents. These firms have low technological and market distance from their parent 
firms. Because they “imitate" the technical and market knowledge of their parents, they 
end up competing with limited resources against the par nt firm. These spinouts may also 
face competition also from firms in proximity to their parents’ markets. The threat of 
appropriation from their parent firms is high; therefore, these spinouts may seek partners 
that are distant from the parent firm, but interested in gaining access to knowledge within 
the spinout.  
 
− − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − 
Insert Figure 1 (Spinout Categories) here 
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− − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − 
 
 In the second category, spinouts choose to apply the knowledge inherited from 
their parents in a product market different from their parents’ market. These spinouts 
“adapt” to new markets relative to their parents and do not compete directly with their 
parents. Further, this provides an opportunity for the parent firm and its collaborators to 
enter into new product markets by forming alliance ties with the spinouts.  
 The third category of spinouts enters a product market similar to their parents’ but 
is distant on the technical knowledge dimension from the parents. Given the application 
of new technology in the same product market space, this type of spinout competes with 
the parent by using technologies that may potentially disrupt the parent’s technological 
capabilities.  While firms in the parent network may be interested in leveraging the 
different technology, they also pose a potential threat of appropriation.  Accordingly, 
while there is a likelihood of alliance formation with firms in the parent network given 
complementarities between spinout technical knowledge and their relevant 
complementary assets, spinouts may proceed cautiously.  
 The final category of spinouts “explores” new product markets relative to their 
parents’ product markets, using new technology withrespect to their parent firms’ 
technology. These spinouts use neither technical nor market knowledge from their 
parents and, as a result, do not directly compete with their parents. 
Proclivity to Form Ties: Need versus Risk 
 A key driver of inter-organizational alliance ties is the need for complementary 
resources (Gulati, 1999). An alliance tie is established when two organizations have 
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mutually beneficial resources or capabilities. The ne d for resources could go beyond 
financial resources and include resources required for accessing a market (Aiken & Hage, 
1968). Regulatory resources are one such resource cru ial to gaining market access in the 
medical device and pharmaceutical industry. Successful pinouts in this industry inherit 
regulatory, in addition to the technical and market, nowledge from their parent firms 
(Chatterji, 2009).  
New firms have limited resources (Fichman & Levinthal, 1991) but can access 
these unique resources through their partner firms (Katila, Rosenberger, & Eisenhardt, 
2008). On the other hand, incumbents seek partners o enter into new or emerging 
technological subfields to deal with their incumbency (Mitchell & Singh, 1992). 
Compared to a new firm, the incumbent has different source needs but the same 
motivation to form alliance ties—namely, to access resources within partner firms. 
Scholars have examined the role of firm attributes such as size, age, and financial 
attributes in predicting the proclivity of a firm to form a tie (Burgers, Hill & Kim, 1993; 
Kogut, Shan, & Walker, 1992). However, resource needs might be the key factor 
determining a firm’s decision to enter into an alliance. Firms manage their need for 
resources by seeking strategic ties to partners who help fulfill the needs (Schmidt & 
Kochan, 1977). This need for resources or capabilities might, in fact, moderate the 
pattern of inter-organizational alliance ties that the firm establishes (Nohria & Garcia-
Pont, 1991).  
 On the other hand, collaborating to gain access to complementary resources is not 
without risk. Collaboration risk for a new venture st ms from potential partner behavior 
in an alliance. The partnering firm could choose not to contribute to the alliance and 
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withhold its efforts. Additionally, the partner could misappropriate resources (Gulati & 
Gargiulo, 1999) from the new firm, rendering the new firm vulnerable without its 
valuable resources. Incumbents rely on their alliance ties to gather information regarding 
their partners’ behavior. They are more likely to partner with firms with whom they had 
prior alliance experience (Gulati, Lavie, & Singh, 2009). Absent prior alliance ties, new 
ventures rely on their founders’ prior affiliations to gain information about their partners. 
In addition to these concerns, spinouts continue to face competitive pressures from their 
parent firms. As a result, prior affiliation plays an important role in shaping the strategic 
alliance ties established by new ventures. 
Role of Prior Founder Affiliation 
 Spinouts inherit technical and market knowledge from their parents, and this 
knowledge drives their resource needs. On the other hand, the technological and market 
distance between a spinout and its parent firm also dictate the collaboration risk. Spinouts 
in close technological or market proximity to their parents compete for resources in both 
spaces, increasing the threat of resource appropriation for the spinout, whereas greater 
technological and product market distance implies a lower level of competition. As a 
result, these distances capture the spinout’s need for resources as well as its risk in 
collaborating with a potential partner.  
 A network tie between two firms is established when the tie is mutually 
beneficial. However, the true value of a network tie is not realized ex-ante. Hence, firms 
seek out partners based on the potential partner firms’ characteristics. A spinout will 
weigh its need for resources against the risk of collab ration with its partner. The 
literature on network formation among firms has examined the network formation 
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process as an attempt by firms to gain access to critical esources (Gulati, 1999) while 
avoiding partners that could behave opportunistically. Further, inter-organizational 
alliance networks serve as conduits of information about potential opportunistic behavior 
of firms (Gulati & Gargiulo, 1999). Absent network ties, new firms cannot access 
information regarding opportunistic behavior of their potential partners. New firms, then, 
must rely on alternative sources of information. Spinouts rely on their founders’ prior 
experience to access the information required to determine the attractiveness of potential 
partners. The founders’ social capital allows spinouts to access information about 
complementary resources within the parent, or firms with ties to the parent, and about the 
behavior of their potential partners. Spinouts use this information to seek out partners that 
meet their resource needs with minimal risk of opportunistic behavior.  
 Forming network ties with other firm benefits the spinout. Such collaborative ties 
allow the spinout to access complementary resources in partner firm and help gain 
legitimacy in the industry (Podolny, 1993). However, fo ming ties is not without its 
pitfalls, especially for new ventures. Firms entering new ties face concerns about the 
hazard of partners behaving opportunistically (Hamel, Doz, & Prahalad, 1989; 
Williamson, 1991). A partner may simply behave opportunistically by limiting its 
contribution or by taking advantage of the relationship to misappropriate valuable 
resources. Misappropriating spinout resources may be tempting for an incumbent and 
could hinder the spinout’s success or survival. Firms minimize the risk of opportunistic 
behavior by accessing information about the partner’s r liability through their current 
networks (Gulati, 1995a; 1995b). This information is crucial, especially when survival 
and success depend on partner behavior (Bleeke & Ernst, 1993). Spinouts that do not 
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have prior ties tend to rely more on the founders’ social capital to access similar 
information. Therefore, the new firm’s origin is cru ial in shaping their network. 
 For an incumbent firm, forming network ties with a new venture is an alternative 
to developing technology or a product internally (Rothaermel, 2001). Spinouts, whose 
employees inherit knowledge and use the knowledge to create similar or different 
products, are specifically attractive to incumbents. At the same time, the long road to 
product commercialization is laden with difficulties (Gans & Stern, 2003) for employee 
entrepreneurs in high-technology industries because of their limited resources. Therefore, 
an incumbent seeks partners in order to enter new technical subfields and offers resources 
to commercialize the product. For example, Eli Lilly entered into an alliance with 
Genentech, which held the proprietary technology for human insulin based on 
recombinant DNA (Humulin). Genentech decided to license the technology to Eli Lilly 
instead of producing it on its own (Lee & Burrill, 1994). This was an opportunity for Eli 
Lilly to enter the market with new technology licens d from a new venture.  
 Spinouts seek partners that fulfill their own resource needs while minimizing the 
risk of losing resources to the partners. An alliance tie will allow the spinout to access 
resources within its partner firm. Prior research has shown that forming an alliance tie 
reduces uncertainty, and both firms gain access to crucial resources from the other partner 
(Pfeffer & Slancik, 1978). New ventures form ties despite their concerns about the 
hazards of opportunistic behavior by partners—when t  partners provide the unique 
resources they need (Katila et al., 2008). However, a spinout can overcome the risk of 
misappropriation by their partner by using the founder’s social capital to access relevant 
information about the partner’s behavior (Gulati, 1995b). Because the spinout relies on its 
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founder’s social capital—accumulated during tenure at the parent firm—the parent 
continues to cast a shadow on relationships forged by the spinout. That is, knowledge 
inheritance shapes the resource needs and the risk of collaborating with firms that have 
direct or indirect ties to the parent. 
Formation of Spinout Alliance Ties 
 The founder’s prior experience creates certain path dependency in the search for 
partners. Absent prior alliances, spinouts are limited to searching locally for partners 
because of their organizational and relational context (Rosenkopf & Almeida, 2003). 
Usually, this means searching for firms that have dir ct or indirect ties to the parent. 
Partners with direct or indirect ties to the parent firm provide opportunities for the spinout 
to access complementary resources, similar to those of its parent, but the collaboration 
risk may differ for these two types of partners. Furthermore, the founder’s prior 
affiliation to the parent firm acts as a source of information regarding these firms. Firms 
with direct ties to the parent firm are a good source to gain access to the complementary 
resources the young firm needs.  
However, spinouts that continue to face collaboratin r sk due to tension between 
the parent and the spinout could choose to access th e resources while distant from their 
parent’s immediate network. A spinout’s resource neds and capabilities drive its 
alliance-partner selection. In addition, the firm’s social context limits its search for 
resources (Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1996; Gulati, 1995a). In the case of the spinouts, 
their founders’ prior affiliations strongly influence their social context. By the virtue of 
their founders’ experience in the parent firm, these spinouts have information about the 
firms that have direct and indirect ties to the parent. Any firm beyond the second level of 
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ties to the parent is too distant, reducing the probability the founder had a relationship 
with them during their tenure in the parent firm. The level of collaboration risk could 
vary across firms that have direct or indirect tieso the parents.  
 Resource needs and collaboration risk are influenced by the technological and 
market distance between the parent and the spinout. The technological and market 
distance shapes the resource needs as well as the collaboration risk, but also translate to 
opportunities to form ties with firms within or outside of the parent network. I define 
these potential partners as firms with parent direct ti s, parent indirect ties, and no parent 
ties. Each network level implies different opportuni ies to fulfill resource needs, along 
with different levels of collaboration risk.  
 Firms with direct ties to the parent firm have resources relevant to spinouts that 
use their parent knowledge due to their founders’ impr nt on the new venture (Agarwal et 
al., 2004; Franco & Filson, 2006). These firms would be lucrative options for alliance 
partners. However, a spinout inherits competition, along with the knowledge, from their 
parent. Similarity in knowledge implies fierce competition between the parent and 
spinout, making the alliance with the parent firm or its partners prone to collaboration 
risk.  
 The second category of partners is firms with indirect ties to the parent. These 
firms can provide resources similar as the parents’ resources. Further, not having any 
direct tie to the parent implies a lower collaboration risk for the spinout. However, it is 
more challenging for spinouts to search for these partners, as they cannot search in 
proximity to the parent firms. Nevertheless, spinouts benefit from ties with firms that 
have indirect parent ties; they can fulfill their resource needs and avoid the risk associated 
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with collaborating with parent partners. Furthermore, spinouts can leverage their 
founders’ experience to search for partners within firms that have direct or indirect ties to 
the parent. They can access information about a potential partner firm’s behavior through 
their founders’ pre-entry experience. 
 The final set of partners is firms that have neither direct nor indirect ties to the 
parent firm. If the collaboration risk is too high and the competition too fierce between 
the parent and spinout, then the spinout is likely to search for firms with no parent ties. 
Additionally, if the spinout is not similar to the parent, they are likely to seek partners 
that have resources relevant to the market of entry (Helfat & Liberman, 2002). In sum, 
each type of partner (Figure 2) represents a different level of collaboration risk and ability 
to fulfill resource needs.   
 
− − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − 
Insert Figure 2 (Partner Types) here 
− − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − 
 
 If the spinout is similar to its parent, then competition between the parent and the 
spinouts is fierce. For these spinouts, forming an alliance tie with a parent or other firm 
with direct or indirect ties to the parent is a risky undertaking. Spinouts that have low 
technological and market distance are the classic “imitators” described in spinout 
literature (Agarwal et al., 2004; Franco & Filson, 2006). These spinouts are similar to 
their parents with respect to both their products and their technology. Hence, competition 
in their parent product market makes formation of alliance ties to firms with direct or 
indirect parent ties prone to collaboration risk. The collaboration risk level differs for 
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firms that have parent direct, parent indirect, or n  parent ties. Similarly, the types of 
resources that could fulfill the spinout’s needs vary across these three partner types. 
 Spinouts that are similar to their parents compete in he same market and with 
similar technology as the parents. Therefore, the par nts and parent partners can provide 
access to resources that are relevant to the market of entry for these new ventures. 
Clearly, forming ties with firms that have direct ties to the parent will fulfill the spinout’s 
resource needs. Moreover, spinouts will pursue alliance ties with firms that have direct 
parent ties to fulfill their resource needs if they do not anticipate any collaboration risk. 
 
Hypothesis 1a. Spinouts with low technological distance and low market 
distance with respect to their parents are more likly to form ties with 
firms with direct ties to their parent firms. 
 
 Compared to firms with direct ties to the parent firm, firms with indirect parent 
ties have relevant resources for the spinout to fulfill its needs and lower collaboration 
risk. For a spinout that has similar technology andproduct market as its parent, firms 
with direct parent ties continue to offer the resources the spinout seeks but with higher 
collaboration risk than firms with indirect parent ties. Therefore, when a spinout is likely 
to benefit from resources within firms with indirect parent ties—and these resources are 
crucial, complementary assets required for the spinout’s success—the spinout might risk 
forging these ties. 
 
Hypothesis 1b. Spinouts with low technological distance and low market 
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distance with respect to the parents are more likely to form ties with firms 
that have indirect ties to their parent firms. 
 
 Conversely, spinouts with low technological and market distances compete 
directly with their parent firms because they imitate both technical and market 
knowledge. This competition increases their concern about potential opportunistic 
behavior by firms with direct or indirect ties to the parent. This would imply that the risk 
of collaboration with firms with either direct or indirect ties to the parent outweighs the 
benefits of access to complementary resources within those firms. Hence, these spinouts 
seek partners that have no ties to their parent firm.  
 
Hypothesis 1c. Spinouts with low technological distance and low market 
distance with respect to the parents are more likely to form ties with firms 
that have no ties to their parent firms. 
 
 Spinouts that have high technological and market distances from their parent firm 
create new knowledge, unrelated to their parent’s products or technology, while operating 
in a different market than their parents do. However, founders can leverage their 
accumulated social capital, gained through their prior employment, to establish external 
relationships (Hallen, 2008). These prior ties create path dependencies regarding partner 
choice. Firms that have direct or indirect ties to the parent could be a good source of 
complementary resources relevant to the spinouts’ market entry. Spinouts rely on their 
founders’ prior affiliations and seek partners within their parent networks to fulfill their 
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need for complementary resources. The founders ‘social capital allows these firms to 
access information regarding their potential partners’ behavior, which would reduce the 
risk, associated with collaboration. In sum, the complementary resources within the firms 
that have direct ties to the parent will fulfill the spinouts’ resource needs, and the 
founders’ prior affiliations offset the collaboration risk. As a result, these spinouts tend to 
form ties with parent partners and not with firms that have indirect or no parent ties. 
Hence,  
 
Hypothesis 2a. Spinouts with high technological distance and high market 
distance with respect to the parents are more likely to form ties with firms 
with direct ties to their parent firms. 
 
 Spinouts that are in different product markets and have different technology from 
their parents do not face stiff competition from their parents. This difference in market 
and technology lowers, but does not eliminate, collab ration risk. The risk is lower with 
firms that have indirect ties to the parent. Moreover, spinouts can leverage their founders’ 
experience to search for firms that have indirect ti s to the parents and can fulfill their 
resource needs. These spinouts are more likely to form ties with firms that have indirect 
ties to the parent and avoid firms that have direct or no parent tie. Hence, 
 
Hypothesis 2b. Spinouts with high technological distance and high market 
distance with respect to the parents are more likely to form ties with firms 




 On the other hand, these spinouts do not have any related technical or product 
knowledge with respect to their parents. Hence, these firms would seek a partner in their 
market of entry (Helfat & Liberman, 2002) or one with no ties to the parents. These 
spinouts are not entering the parent market; therefore, irms with direct or indirect parent 
ties would not necessarily hold relevant complementary resources for the spinouts. 
Additionally, the spinouts could face collaboration risk if they form ties with firms that 
have either direct or indirect ties to the parent network. As a result,  
 
Hypothesis 2c. Spinouts with high technological distance and high market 
distance with respect to the parents are more likely to form ties with firms 
that have no ties to their parent firms. 
 
 The third category of spinouts is new ventures that have high technological 
distance from their parents, but operate in similar product markets. These spinouts seek 
complementary assets relevant to their market of entry (Helfat & Liberman, 2002)—the 
parent market, in this case. Firms with direct or indirect ties to the parent operate in a 
product market similar to the parents and have resources relevant for the spinout product 
market.  
 These spinouts introduce products in the parents’ product market space but with 
different technology. The spinout’s technology poses the threat of making the parents’ 
technology obsolete. As a result, these spinouts also pose a threat to the technology 
within the parent and to the parents’ direct or indirect partners.  
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 Spinouts with high technological distance but low market distance can leverage 
their founders’ prior affiliation to seek partners among firms that have direct parent ties. 
These ties offer the complementary resources that the spinouts need, especially when 
operating in a similar market as their parents. However, each partner category holds 
different risk levels. In this category, the spinouts hold bargaining power as they enter 
similar markets with different technology from their parents. Hence, they can reduce 
collaboration risk and reap alliance benefits by forming ties with firms that have direct 
ties to their parent as opposed to indirect or no parent tie.  
 
Hypothesis 3a. Spinouts with high technological distance and low market 
distance with respect to the parents are more likely to form ties with firms 
with direct ties to their parent firms. 
 
When spinouts operate in a similar market as their parent, they may search for 
alliance partners based on their founders’ pre-entry experience. If a spinout perceives a 
high risk when forming ties with firms that have direct parent ties, then it can fulfill its 
need for complementary resources by forming ties with firms that have indirect parent 
ties as compared direct or no parent tie.  
 
Hypothesis 3b. Spinouts with high technological distance and low market 
distance with respect to the parents are more likely to form ties with firms 




Alternatively, these spinouts face fierce competition from firms with direct or 
indirect parent ties by the virtue of having different technology relative to their parents. 
This competition could increase the collaboration risk; partner firms could potentially 
misappropriate spinout resources. Additionally, because these spinouts operate in 
different markets than their parents, they could seek partners from the different markets. 
Hence, these spinouts seek partners outside of their parents’ direct or indirect network to 
access complementary resources relevant to their market of entry while minimizing 
collaboration risk. Therefore, 
 
Hypothesis 3c. Spinouts with high technological distance and low market 
distance with respect to the parents are more likely to form ties with firms 
that have no ties to their parent firms. 
 
Unpacking Resource Requirements 
Spinouts create alliance ties to gain access to resou ces. The obvious next 
question is what resources are being transferred across these ties. These young firms have 
to engage in long periods of research and development (R&D) before introducing a 
product into the market. They support themselves by eeking resources from other 
organizations. Spinouts that choose partners within or outside parent networks seek 
different resources. I define five types of resources: research, commercial, manufacturing, 
funding, and marketing resources.  
Research resources relate to any R&D activity the spinout undertakes. 
Commercial resources allow the firm to commercialize their product or introduce it in the 
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market. A firm uses manufacturing resources in its production process and marketing 
resources to market or distribute its product. Funding resources include the various forms 
of funding a firm receives, and range from venture f nding to bank loans. A young firm 
could also fund itself by giving the overseas marketing or manufacturing rights of one of 
its products to other firms. These funds would in turn be used to finance the R&D 
associated with their core technology. Hence, I group marketing, manufacturing, and 
funding resources into one category. 
Do these spinouts seek specific resources when they form ties with firms that 
have direct or indirect ties to the parent firm? When spinouts seek partners that directly or 
indirectly relate to their parents, they gain information about their potential partner 
behavior through their founder. These spinouts can scope out potential partners for their 
behavior and avoid collaboration risk by gathering information through their founders’ 
prior experience. As new ventures, spinouts need resources to aid their commercialization 
process. Most spinouts like to control R&D of their core products and are therefore 
unlikely to seek research resources. Instead, they search for partners to fulfill their 
commercialization resource needs and avoid research ties with firms that have either 
direct or indirect parent ties to avoid collaboration risk. Hence,  
 
Hypothesis 4: Spinouts that form ties with firms that have direct or 
indirect ties to their parent are most likely to seek commercialization 
resources. 
 
What resources are transferred across a tie when spinouts partner with firms that 
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have no ties to the parent firm? Spinouts that seekpartners with no ties to the parent 
cannot rely on their founders’ prior affiliation to c llect information about the potential 
partners. In this case, collaboration risk is very high due to lack of information about 
potential partner behavior. Therefore, forming tieso transfer research or 
commercialization resources is risky. These ties deal with core firm technology; the firm 
could expose itself to potential exploitation by its partner. As a result, these spinouts seek 
only marketing, manufacturing, and funding resources from partners with no parent ties. 
Thus, 
 
Hypothesis 5: Spinouts that form ties with firms that ave no ties to their 
parent firm are most likely to seek marketing, manuf cturing, and funding 
resources. 
Data and Methodology 
I test these hypotheses in the context of the pharmaceutical and medical device 
industry. This industry provides an ideal empirical ontext to study inter-firm tie 
formation for three reasons. First, the industry is highly competitive; innovation is key to 
success. Second, the industry is highly regulated. The U.S. Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA) approval is one of the key steps to introducing the product into the 
market. As such, highly competitive industry resources related to regulation and 
manufacturing plays a crucial role in the firm’s success. Hence, a new venture needs 
access to crucial complementary resources, such as marketing resources, or to resources 
to overcome market regulations. The need for constant innovation in the face of 
regulatory barriers to market entry fuels collaborati n across firms. Thus, a firm can 
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choose to diversify its strategic network ties with equity ties (Santos & Eisenhardt, 2009), 
nonequity ties, or joint ventures (Helfat & Lieberman, 2002). Finally, the R&D stage in 
the pharmaceutical and medical device industry is too long for young firms to survival 
without external support.  
New ventures provide a unique opportunity to examine how networks emerge 
from the inception of the firm. One of the challengs of studying new venture alliances is 
the difficulty collecting data on young firms whose information is not publicly available 
and data on founder backgrounds. I am able to overcme these challenges by using data 
from Medical and HealthCare Marketplace Guides betwe n 1986 and 2003. I digitize 
these books to create a unique database that contains firm-, division-, and individual-level 
data for firms in the healthcare industry. It contai s data for about 10,000 firms in the 
pharmaceutical and medical device industry from both U.S. and outside-U.S. locations.  
This database contains 2,549 new firms founded after 1973, and I identify the 
founding team for each firm. I define the founding team as the top management team of 
the firm during the first 5 years from the founding year. This definition works well, as the 
founder has a strong influence on the selection of the top management team. Even if this 
top management team changes, the composition of the ini ial team remains the same; and 
the founders’ influence persists in the choice of future top management teams (Beckman 
& Burton, 2008). To classify these firms as spinouts, I track employment history of the 
top management of all 2,549 firms. If one member of the top management team worked 
at an incumbent firm prior to the founding year of the new firm, then I classify the firm as 
a spinout. I repeat this process using ThompsonOne data to track the employment history 
of the top management team within the first three yars of founding. By tracking prior 
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employers, I identify 296 spinouts in the pharmaceuti al and medical device industry: 
182 (62%) in pharmaceuticals, 78 (26%) in medical devices, and 36 (12%) in both. I 
update the data on spinouts from the Medical Marketplace database in the pharmaceutical 
and medical device industry to the year 2012 by colle ting data from LexisNexis, the 
U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) filings, COMPUSTAT, Delphion, 
Corporate Affiliations, ventureXpert and ThompsonOne. The resulting dataset is a panel 
data of pharmaceutical and medical device firms from 1986 to 2012. 
I combine data from the Medical Marketplace database with net sales, gross 
profit, number of employees, and R&D expenses from COMPUSTAT. I extract the initial 
public offering (IPO) year from the Medical Marketplace data, COMPUSTAT, and 
ventureXpert; and the year of first funding from ventrueXpert. I track the four-digit 
product standard industrial classification (SIC) code from Corporate Affiliations and 
Medical Marketplace data. I supplement the entry and exit years of each product market 
for each firm with information from the Medical Marketplace data. I collect post-2003 
network information from LexisNexis and Securities Data Company databases and use 
this data to plot the spinout ego network (Figure 3) for only network ties between the 
spinout and other firms. I collect patent data for the spinouts and their parents from the 
Delphion database. The result is an unbalanced panel d ta of spinouts in the 
pharmaceutical and medical device industry from 1986 to 2012. 
An alliance tie in my empirical context is any formal relationship established 
between two firms in order to gain access to resources within the other firm. A formal tie 
between two firms could take any form of formal relationship, such as collaboration or 
agreements, joint venture, alliance, equity, and nonequity ties. With the aid of the 
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Medical Marketplace data, I am able to collect data on collaboration among firms and, 
specifically for this study, data on new ventures founded by employee entrepreneurs. 
However, this data ends in 2003; to make the data current, I combine it with data from 
the LexisNexis database and SEC filings. This rich data on firm collaborations provides 
information regarding the year of tie formation, resources transferred across the tie, and 
type of relationship. This unique data allows me to xamine the network ties the spinouts 
formed, from inception to 2012.  
Knowledge plays a vital role in the success and survival of firms in high-
technology industries. However, knowledge can be divided into the two dimensions of 
technology and market. It is important to differentiate between these two forms of 
knowledge because not all technical knowledge within a firm transforms into a product in 
the market. Distinguishing between the two knowledge imensions allows us to 
understand how spinouts inherit knowledge from the parent and which type of knowledge 
inheritance plays an important role in shaping the spinout’s strategic networks. 
Technological knowledge is captured using a distance measure based on patent 
class. I collect patent data for each firm from the Delphion database and use it to create 
the measure TECHDIST. This measure captures the distance between two firms in 
technological space using the distribution of patents across the various patent technology 
classes. It allows me to measure technological distance between any two firms, and 
especially between a parent and a spinout. I use the average share of patents per firm in 
each technology class and define a vector  
Ti = (Ti1, Ti2, Ti3,… Ti426), where Tik is the share of patents of firm i in technology class k. 
The technology market information for patents is classified into 426 markets (Bloom, 
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Schankerman, & Reenen, 2013).1 Then, I define the TECHDIST between two firms i and 









This index ranges between 0 and 1, depending on the degree of distance in technology 
class, and is symmetric to firm ordering, so that TECHDISTij = TECHDISTji. 
Patents provide a relevant measure of technology in the pharmaceutical and 
medical device industry and provide firms with fairly strong protection for their 
proprietary knowledge. As products of a firms’ innovation, patents represent a valid 
measure of technological novelty within the firm (Griliches, 1990). Patents have been 
shown to relate closely to technological strength (Narin, Elliott, & Ross, 1987) and 
correlate highly to innovation and invention counts.  
There are limitations to using patents as a measure, for two main reasons. First, 
not all inventions or innovations are patentable. Patentability varies across industries, but 
is not the case in this study. Patents are crucial for a firm in the pharmaceutical and 
medical device industry to protect technical knowledg . A second issue could arise 
because firms’ propensity to patent may vary (Cohen and Levin, 1989). However, new 
and incumbent firms in high-technology industries protect their intellectual property 
                                                
1. Bloom et al.’s (2013) measure modified the Euclidean distance measure to better capture both 
technological knowledge and market distance based on patent main class and product sales in each of the 
markets is defined by the respective SIC codes. This index is also a modified version of Jaffe’s (1986) 




fiercely (Agarwal, Ganco, & Ziedonis, 2009). Hence, in context of this study, patents are 
a good way to capture technological distance.   
To measure market knowledge, I construct a similar measure for product market 
distance using the presence of a firm in each market segment, defined based on the four-
digit SIC code. Although the SIC code is a good measure of markets in which the firms 
operate, it is a very aggregated measure of products within the firms. An alternative 
would be to create a classification system based on the complete product list of each firm. 
Although I have the data to do this, one of my major concerns in using such a system is 
that some products would not be comparable. Therefore, maintaining a consistent 
classification system across the industries would not be feasible using product-level data 
as the market measure. Instead, using the SIC system worked well to generate a market 
distance measure. I define the presence of a firm in each industry code by a vector Si = 
(Si1, Si2, Si3,… Sin), where Sim is the dummy of firm i’s presence in the product market m. 









This measure ranges from 0 to 1, depending on the degree of distance in technology 
class, and is symmetric to firm ordering, so that MRKTDISTij = MRKTDISTji. 
I collect four-digit SIC code information on these firms from the Medical 
Marketplace, Corporate Affiliations, and LexisNexis database. Using the identified 
market classes, I create a unique set of classes Si to generate the market distance measure. 
The patented technology and products of the spinout is used to define the knowledge 
distance between parent and spinout. The spinout may inherit knowledge and then patent 
it. However, it may choose not to compete in a similar product market as its parent or 
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choose to use a different technology in the parent market. Therefore, this becomes an 
important distinction when classifying the spinouts (Figure 1). Market distance is 
classified into two categories (high or low) through a cutoff value of the median of the 
distance measure (0.23). Similarly, the technological distance is divided into two 
categories (high or low) using a cutoff value of the median of that measure (0.45). 
Spinouts are classified based on the two categories technological distance and market 
distance. 
 
− − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − 
Insert Table 1 (Variable Definitions) here 
− − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − 
 
Thus, spinouts are classified into four categories based on the above definitions. 
There are 235 spinouts with complete patent and prouct data from the initial sample of 
296. Of those 235 spinouts, the classification process yields: 
• 151 (64%) with low technological and market distance 
• 59 (25%) with high technological and low market distance 
• 15 (6%) with high technological and market distance 
• 10 (5%) with low technological and high market distance  
The 235 spinouts have 825 partner firms. As extended, th  partners of these 825 
partners, spinouts, parents, and partner firms totaled 3,195 firms. I generate dyad level 
data for spinouts by creating a dyad where each spinout has an opportunity to form ties 
with any of the remaining 3,194 firms. The summary statistics of all the variables are 





− − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − 
Insert Table 2 (Descriptive Statistics) here 
− − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − 
 
Dependent Variables 
The key dependent variable captures the different types of partner firms based on 
the presence or absence of ties to the parent. The thre  groups of partners are direct, 
indirect, or no parent ties. The first group includes the parent and firms that have direct 
ties to the parent firm. The second group consists of firms that are partners of the parents’ 
partner firms or that have indirect ties to the parent. Finally, the firms that have neither 
direct nor indirect ties to the parent compose the third group, partners with no parent ties.  
Based on these partner type definitions, I generate the first dependent variable 
“parentNetwork.” This variable takes the values: 1, firms with direct ties to the parent; 2, 
firms with indirect ties to the parent; 3, firms with no ties to the parent; or 0 otherwise.  
To further understand the formation of inter-organiz tional ties among spinouts, I 
examine the type of resources transferred across the e ties. For this analysis, I create a 
second dependent variable that takes a value of 1 to 3 for research, commercial, and 
marketing or funding resources, respectively. This variable takes the value of 0 when 
there are no ties between the two firms.  
Independent Variable 
The key independent variable captures the different types of spinouts. To 
understand how knowledge inherited by a firm founded by an employee entrepreneur 
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influences networking behavior, I categorize the spinouts based on their technical and 
market knowledge. This yields four dummies for each type of spinout.  
In the first category, spinouts have low technological distance and low market 
distance from their parent firm. These spinouts imitate the knowledge of their parent. In 
the second category, spinouts have high technological d stance and high market distance. 
These firms do not inherit any knowledge from their pa ents. The third category is 
spinouts that have high technological distance and low market distance. These firms enter 
the parent market with disruptive technology. The final category is spinouts that have low 
technological distance and high market distance. Thse spinouts enter the new market 
with knowledge inherited by the parent. This final c tegory is the control group for my 
analysis.  
Control Variables 
I control for spinout characteristics such as age, number of patents, patent citation, 
number of employees, and location. Incumbents could find partners among the new 
ventures when they find the technology within the spinout attractive. Therefore, I control 
for spinout partner technological and product market distances. I also control for 
incumbents’ characteristics such as their patents and network centrality. Network 
centrality is an important measure to understand how a spinout with ties can position 
itself in a network to best gain from its network ties. The central player is assumed to 
have access to the best resources. Spinouts enter with a disadvantageous situation: by 
inheriting knowledge from the parent firm, they arecompeting with the parent. However, 
forming ties with other firms allows the spinout to c mpete with other firms in its product 
market. Although new ventures may lack the prior alliance ties that incumbents’ possess, 
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they can leverage their prior affiliation with their parents and their knowledge to form 
ties. Forming alliance ties with incumbents helps en ure the spinouts gain access to 
critical complementary resources early and helps legitimize (Podolny, 1993) the spinout 
in the industry. This provides the new venture an opportunity to leverage these ties to 
form more ties with other prominent firms and improve its network position, especially 
centrality. Hence, I include controls for “betweennss” centrality of parent and partner 
firms because it captures the flow of information across firms. I also control for parent 
and partner characteristics, such as the number of patents, using a count or a dummy and 
number of ties.  
Methods 
 There are two parts to this analysis: estimating tie formation with different types 
of partners and analyzing the resources transferred across these ties. For the first part, I 
use exponential random graph models (ERGM).2 Additionally, I use multinomial logistic 
regression to see if these findings hold and to estimate the different types of resources 
accessed through the ties. 
Estimation Using ERGM 
To understand processes that influence network formation (Hypotheses 1-3), I 
                                                
2. The ERGM is important when analyzing tie formation. The key difference between logistic 
regression and ERGM is that logistic regression analyzes only the ego network, whereas ERGM estimates 
tie formation based on the complete network of all irms. The ERGM estimation considers simultaneous tie 
formation and is a complete network analysis. This means that the ERGM estimation requires data on the 
network and attributes of both the spinout and its partner firms. Because logistic regression only estimates 
the spinout ego network, it requires data on the spinout network and attributes to estimate tie formation. 
Thus, ERGM is a better estimation method to analyze alliance tie formation. The ERGM results have to be 
interpreted similar to logistic regression results. 
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consider the set of all possible networks that could be formed and compare the set to the 
observed network. The ERGM is better suited to estimating network formation because it 
improves on logistic estimation, which tests one dyadic tie at a time. A comparison of 
ERGM estimation to logistic regression is explained b low. 
Let the network adjacency matrix be denoted as . If node  and node  have a 
link, then 
  1, otherwise 
  0. By convention, a node cannot link to itself, so 
  0. This is a standard way to organize data in the social network analysis literature. 
In my application, each firm is a node, with a set of characteristics that I collect in the 
matrix X, (e.g. firm age, resource diversity). 
A logistic regression model would estimate the probability of a link between firm 
i and j as a function of the node characteristics 

  1|                        !,  
where gij is the entry of the adjacency matrix and X is the set of firm 
characteristics. However, the logistic model assumes that each entry of the adjacency 
matrix is independent; that is, each link is formed independently. This assumption is quite 
strong in this study. Concretely, the assumption of independence means that if Firm 1 is 
considering whether to form a link to Firm 2, their decision is not affected by the links 
that Firm 1 had already formed in the past. If Firm 1 were forming the link to Firm 2 in 
search of higher resource diversity, the assumption of i dependence would be clearly 
violated. In addition, the assumption of independence also rules out that Firm 1’s 
decision to form a link with Firm 2 does not depend o  the network Firm 2 had created in 
the past. However, it is imaginable that Firm 1 will benefit differently from a link to 
Firm 2 when Firm 2 has a large, rather than small, alliance network. Therefore, it seemed 
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useful to relax the assumption of independence for this study’s specific application. 
The ERGMs are statistical models that allow more flexible specification for 
network models, relaxing the assumption of independence of link formation (Snijders, 
2002). The ERGM estimates the probability of a linkbetween firms i and j conditional on 
the rest of the network and firm characteristics: 

  1|"
,                         !,  
where "
 denotes the network adjacency matrix  excluding the link 
 
between firms i and j. This specification allows for dependence among liks. For 
example, the decision of Firm 1 to connect to Firm 2 ay depend on Firm 1’s, as well as 
Firm 2’s, existing networks. 
The main concern in such a specification is that the conditional probability 

  1|"
,   contains endogenous regressors, because links formed by pairs of 
firms other than i and j are decision variables and therefore endogenous. The main 
advantage of the ERGM specification is the ability to estimate the joint probability of the 
network adjacency matrix—that is, the joint probability of all the 
 elements—and thus 
incorporate dependence between links in the estimation. The joint probability of all 
connections between firms is given by 
#,    $%&'
(,  )
*'  
 where ' is a vector of parameters and (,   is a vector of network statistics (the 
total number of links, the total number of triangles, the total number of links between 
firms in the same market, etc.). These statistics in orporate all the dependencies involved 
in network formation decisions between firms. The probability is known up to a 
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normalizing constant, *', which guarantees that P(g,X) is a proper probability. That is, 
it sums to 1 over all possible network realizations. 
This model represents a probability distribution over all possible networks among 
n firms. Given a vector of parameters ', one can compute which network of firms  is 
the most likely to occur among the 2,,-./  possible networks. Given an observed network 
012, we can find the parameter estimate  '3456 that maximizes the likelihood 
#012| ; '. Given that the size of possible networks vastly outnumbers the parameters, 
estimating the probability of a network forming is computationally intensive, and requires 
Monte Carlo simulation methods.  
Notice that the conditional model 
  1|"
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,   is the change in the vector of network statistics generated when 
the additional link between firm i and j is formed. 
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The variables in this estimation method are in matrix format. The dependent 
matrix, the network of reported inter-firm ties, is created for all 1,182 firms. If two firms 
have a tie, 1 is entered in the matrix cell at the int rsection of the focal firm’s row and the 
partner’s column; and 0 is entered otherwise (Ingram & Roberts, 2000). This matrix 
captures the formal ties formed by the spinout, which includes equity, nonequity, joint 
venture, and acquisition ties. Nonequity ties include collaboration or any other form of 
agreements. However, this matrix only captures the par nt-spinout relationship that is 
established through some formal tie such as research, marketing, or commercial 
collaboration.  
The second attributes matrix account for firm patents, technological distance, 
market distance, location, and degree centrality. This attributes matrix comprises the 
independent variables that determine the tie formation. 
Results and Discussion 
 
− − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − 
Insert Figure 3 (Spinout Ego Network) here 
− − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − 
 
To visualize the formation of network ties among spinouts and other incumbents, 
I plot the spinout ego network as of 2011 (Figure 3). The spinouts represented by red dots 
are connected to the parent as well as nonparent fims. About 3% of the spinouts form a 
network tie with their parent. Only one spinout, Guidant Corp., forms an exclusive tie 
with the parent firm, Eli Lilly Corp.; it has 17 patents. In the graph, a black link 
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represents a parent-spinout relationship; employees of the parent firm create the spinout. 
A red link represents strategic network ties with a nonparent firm. Few spinouts are more 
connected to incumbents, as clearly seen from the clustering in the top half of the graph. 
The graph shows that most spinouts are likely to form network ties with incumbent firms 
and, at times, with other spinouts. The spinouts that have more than five network ties has 
higher R&D output and products compared to other spinouts. One such firm is ICOS 
Corp., which had over 200 patents and six nonequity ties to nonparent incumbents. ICOS 
Corp. is in a similar product market as its parent firm, Amgen Inc. ICOS formed some 
nonequity ties, such as research collaborations with Glaxo SmithKline in 1994 and 
development and commercialization ties with Eli Lilly and Abbott Laboratories in 1998. 
These firms are competitors of ICOS’s parent firm. This clearly shows that different 
spinouts have different strategies regarding the formation of network ties, which affects 
their performance or research output.  
 
− − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − 
Insert Table 3 (ERGM Estimation) here 
− − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − 
 
Table 3 shows the ERGM estimates for formation of alliance ties by spinouts. The 
table shows estimates for all four spinout categories; the comparison group is firms that 
did not establish ties. I control only for firm location and betweenness centrality, as this 
data is available for both the spinout and its partners. I do not control for firm age and 
size, as this information is not available for all the partner firms. In Table 3, I use a 
sample of 1,182 firms that includes parent firms, spinouts, and spinout partners. The 
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parameters are estimated using simulation methods.3 For each proposed parameter value, 
we simulate the probability of the observed network among the 2,,-./  possible networks 
where n is the number of firms (1,182). For each parameter value, I run the simulation for 
100,000 iterations, and use standard diagnostics to heck convergence of the estimates.4 
The coefficients (Table 3) show that spinouts with s milar technology and 
products as their parents (i.e., low technological and low market distance) prefer to form 
tie with firms that have no parent ties. The coefficient associated with spinouts with ties 
to firms that have indirect parent ties is positive and significant. However, this coefficient 
is lower than the one associated with firms that have no parent ties. These results suggest 
that spinouts that have low technology and low market distance with respect to the parent 
firm are likely to seek ties with firms that have no parent ties, lending support to 
Hypothesis 1c. Furthermore, I find no support for Hypotheses 1a or 1b.  
The second categories of spinouts have different technology than their parent and 
enter a different market than their parents. For this category, the coefficients associated 
with forming ties with firms that have direct, indirect, and no ties to their parent are 
0.413, 0.777, and -0.348, respectively. This result supports Hypothesis 2b, which states 
that spinouts with high technological and high market distances with respect to their 
parents are likely to form ties with firms that have indirect ties to their parent. Also, I do 
not find support for Hypotheses 2a or 2c.  
                                                
3 I use the package Bergm for the open-source statistic l oftware R. 
4 The higher the number of iterations, the more precise the estimates. The trade-off is between 
precision and time for convergence. I experimented with different length of the simulations, to test the 
robustness of my results. 
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Finally, spinouts that have high technological and low market distances from their 
parent are more likely to form ties with firms that have direct ties to their parents. These 
results lend support to Hypothesis 3a and disprove Hypotheses 3b and 3c. These firms 
enter the parent market with new technology relative o their parent firms and pose a 
potential threat to parent technology. As a result, these firms are in a better bargaining 
position than other types of spinouts and are able to take advantage of their founders’ 
prior affiliation to search for partners within firms that have direct parent ties. 
Spinouts enter into alliance ties with other firms in order to gain access to 
resources. New firms have limited resources and enter the market with technology or 
product. However, their survival and success in high-technology industries is contingent 
on forging successful inter-organizational alliance ties to access complementary 
resources. Therefore, the next question is, what resources are transferred across these 
ties? Tables 4 and 5 show the multinomial logistic estimate that examines what resources 
are transferred across inter-organizational alliance ties. The key dependent variable 
captures three categories of resources, ranging from research, commercial, and marketing 
or funding resources. The marketing or funding resources category comprises 
manufacturing, marketing, and funding resources.  
 
− − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − 
Insert Table 4 (Resource Transfer-Direct and Indirect Ties) here 
− − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − 
 
− − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − 
Insert Table 5 (Resource Transfer-No Ties) here 





New ventures have limited, crucial resources and want to protect them from 
misappropriation by their alliance partners. These new firms face a greater level of risk 
when they collaborate with firms that have either direct or indirect ties to their parent. 
Therefore, spinouts that choose to fulfill their need for resources with these firms are 
more likely to seek the resources for commercialization but avoid research ties that would 
allow their partner to access their core technology.  
I find support for this conjecture for all types of spinouts (Table 4). Wald tests 
yielded chi-square values of 4342.58, 24.83, and 58.31 for research, commercial, and 
marketing or funding resources, respectively. All these values were statistically 
insignificant, suggesting that the coefficients of dif erent types of spinouts are statistically 
different. As such, spinouts that seek ties with firms that have either direct or indirect ties 
to their parents access commercial resources throug their alliance ties. Spinouts that 
form ties with firms that have direct or indirect parent ties are those that have different 
technology or operate in different product markets as their parents. Spinouts that are 
different from their parent in either technology or product market forged mostly 
commercialization ties. These results lend support to Hypothesis 4. 
I analyze the resources transferred across ties with firms that have no parent ties 
using multinomial logistic regression (Table 5). Spinouts that have low market and low 
technological distances have the propensity to establi h marketing, manufacturing, and 
funding ties. On the other hand, spinouts that have high technological and product market 
distances are more likely to establish research ties. Furthermore, spinouts that enter 
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similar markets as their parent with a different technology relative to their parent are 
likely to establish marketing, manufacturing, and funding ties. Wald tests yielded chi-
square values of 16.53, 113.71, and 32.88 for reseach, commercial, and marketing or 
funding resources, respectively. All these values ar  not statistically significant, 
suggesting that the coefficients of different types of pinouts are statistically different. In 
sum, spinouts that have similar technology and operate in similar markets as their parents 
are likely to establish marketing, manufacturing, or funding ties with firms that have no 
parent ties, supporting Hypothesis 5.  
Robustness Checks: Multinomial Logistic Estimation for Spinout Alliance Formation 
Prior research uses logistic regression to estimate the propensity to establish an 
alliance tie. Partners are categorized based on the presence or absence of ties to the parent 
firm. Therefore, I use multinomial logistic regression to estimate the spinout’s propensity 
to form alliance ties with firms that have direct, indirect, or no ties to the parent. The 
coefficients generated by the multinomial logistic regression and ERGM cannot be 
compared directly, as the two methods are completely different in their underlying 
estimation methodology. The ERGM is better suited than multinomial logistic regression 
to estimating tie formation, as it accounts for correlation among ties (as explained in the 
methods section). However, it is possible to compare the findings from multinomial 
logistic regression to those from ERGM. In the case of conflict, ERGM results would be 
more reliable. The multinomial logistic regression also allowed me to control for spinout 
characteristics such as firm age and size (number of mployees). This data is not 




The multinomial logistic regression results are shown in Tables 6 and 7. In Table 
6, spinouts in the excluded category have low technological distance and high market 
distance from their parents. Table 6 shows that spinouts similar to their parent in both 
technology and product market (low technological and low market distances) are likely to 
form ties with firms that have no parent tie. This re ult supports Hypothesis 1c and yields 
a conclusion similar to the ERGM results.  
− − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − 
Insert Table 6 (Spinout Partner Choice-Excl hi-low) here 
− − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − 
− − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − 
Insert Table 7 (Spinout Partner Choice-Excl lo-lo) here 
− − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − 
 
The second category is spinouts that have high technological and high market 
distances. These firms are not related to their parent technology or product market. I find 
that these spinouts are more likely to have ties to firms with indirect parent ties, 
supporting Hypothesis 2b. This result is similar to the finding from the ERGM estimates.  
The final spinout category reported in Table 6 is firms that have high 
technological distance and low market distance from their parents. These firms enter the 
parents’ product market using a different technology than their parents and are likely to 
develop ties with firms that have no parent ties. This result contradicts the ERGM 
prediction that these firms would form ties with firms that have direct parent ties. This 
discrepancy may be due to ERGM’s ability to account for he underlying network 
structure that could shape tie formation. Therefore, th  ERGM results are more reliable. 
Wald tests produced chi-square statistics of 7.28, 66.17, and 4.76, for ties to firms with 
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direct, indirect, or no tie to the parent firm, resp ctively. Furthermore, the Wald test 
results were statistically insignificant, suggesting that the coefficients of the three spinout 
categories in this estimation are statistically different.  
I perform additional analysis where I exclude spinouts with low market and 
technological distance from their parent (Table 7). Results in this table suggest that 
spinouts that have high market and high technological distances from their parents are 
likely to form ties with firms that have indirect ties to their parent. This further 
strengthens the findings from the previous multinomial logistic regressions and ERGM 
estimations for Hypotheses 2a-2c. I find that spinouts with high technological and low 
market distances from their parent are more likely to form ties with firms that have direct 
parent ties. These results contradict the multinomial logistic regression (Table 6) and 
concur with the ERGM results in (Table 3). For this ca e, I rely on the ERGM, instead of 
the multinomial logistic regression, results. Wald tests produced chi-square statistics of 
8.97, 50.53, and 9.26 for firms with direct, indirect, or no ties to the parent firm, 
respectively. Furthermore, the Wald tests are statistically insignificant, suggesting that 
the coefficients of the three spinout categories ar statistically different. 
Conclusions 
This chapter set out to examine the effects of a founder’s prior employment in 
shaping the formation of a spinout’s alliance network. A spinout inherits knowledge from 
its parent firm, but this knowledge inheritance comes with strings attached. The spinout 
does not become successful due to inheriting knowledge. Instead, it becomes successful 
based on how it uses this inherited knowledge in the market they enter. One such use of 
knowledge inheritance is to forge external relationships with other firms.  
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To understand the extent of the benefits from inheriting the parent’s network, I 
classify the partner firms based on the presence or absence of their ties to parent firms. 
The three types of partner firms are firms that have direct, indirect, or no parent ties. I 
find that spinouts that have similar technology or are in similar product markets as their 
parents are likely to seek out partners with no parent ties. On the other hand, being 
different from their parents allows these spinouts to reap the benefits of their parents’ 
networks by seeking firms that have either direct or indirect ties to the parents. Spinouts 
that have different technology and enter different markets from their parents forge ties 
with firms that have indirect ties to their parents. This suggests that spinouts fulfill their 
needs by forming ties with firms within their parents’ networks. However, they deal with 
collaboration risk by distancing themselves from the parents’ core network (parents’ 
partners) and form ties with firms that have only idirect ties to the parents. These 
spinouts continue to face competitive pressure and collaboration risk from firms within 
their parents’ networks. Finally, the spinouts that enter a similar product market with 
different technology from their parents’ form ties with the parents’ partners. These 
spinouts enter the parent market with a technology that could threaten the parents’ 
products. This leverage aids the spinouts in negotiating alliance ties with firms that have 
direct ties to the parents.  
Spinouts that forge ties with firms that have direct or indirect parent ties pursue 
only commercialization ties. The partners provide regulatory resources the spinouts need 
to enter the market. However, they shy away from forging research ties with these firms, 
because collaboration risk is too high in the early stages of technology development. 
Spinouts that seek partners with no parent ties are likely to seek manufacturing, 
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marketing, or funding ties. These firms cannot leverag  their founders’ prior affiliation to 
scope out only partner firms that do not pose collab r tion risk. One way to reduce this 
risk is to avoid research or commercialization tieshat would allow partners to access the 
spinout’s core technology. Spinouts that are different from their parents in terms of 
technology and/or product market form ties with firms that have direct or indirect parent 
ties—and these spinouts seek commercialization ties. Spinouts that have similar 
technology and operate in similar product markets, as their parents are the only firms that 
seek firms with no parent ties. These spinouts mostly forge marketing, manufacturing, or 
funding ties. 
One of the challenges to understanding the relationship between a new venture’s 
alliances and its founder’s background lies in creation of the new firm. This study 
captures this role of new venture creation through the knowledge measure. Knowledge 
inheritance is the most common way to capture spinout creation, and I observe the 
knowledge that the firm received from the parent at i s inception. This analysis is limited 
to firm-level controls; individual-level controls were not possible to analyze because the 
available data did not capture individual actions within the firm. 
This paper makes three key contributions to new ventur  alliance and spinout 
literature. First, this study expands the resource perspective of new venture alliance 
formation by examining how young firms make strategic choices to seek resources 
through inter-organizational alliance ties. New ventures face greater collaboration risk 
and need to be very conscientious when seeking partners o fulfill their resource needs. 
Second, this study examines the influence of founders’ social capital on external 
relationships established by new organizations. This connection is difficult to establish in 
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prior studies because of the lack of data regarding new venture alliances and the 
founders’ prior affiliations. The social capital accumulated by the founders’ results from 
the pattern of contact networks those individuals experience. This study enhances 
understanding of how a founder’s social capital transl tes to alliance networks at the firm 
level. Third, this study establishes that the influence of the unique historical conditions 
under which firms are created leads to a path-dependent process of network formation. In 
this study, the parent of the spinout firm continues to cast shadows on the post-spinoff 
relationships it forges.  
A key implication of this study is the continued influence of the parent on the 
spinout’s partner choices. Spinouts similar to their parents with respect to technology and 
product markets are likely to partner with firms with no parent ties. Spinouts that differs 
in both technology and product market are likely to engage in a local search for partners 
that have indirect ties to their parents. Only spinouts that enter the parent market with a 
technology different from their parents are likely to benefit from their parent network and 
seek partners with direct ties to their parent. Therefore, the manager of a new venture 
seeking alliance partners needs to be cognizant of the founder’s background; and if the 
firm is a spinout, the manager needs to be aware of the potential collaborating risk from 
firms in the parent’s network. However, spinouts seek only commercialization resources 
from partners with direct or indirect parent ties. Furthermore, they can deal with 
collaboration risk by screening potential partners or by forming ties that allow access to 
different types of resources. The best way seek partners and leverage the founders’ social 






Chapter 2: Effects of Founders’ Background on Research, 




 New ventures have limited resources and thus benefit from their founders’ pre-
entry experience. The founding conditions of a start-up determine its ability to learn and 
adapt to the competitive environment in the long run (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). The 
founders’ pre-entry experience determines the resources endowed on the start-up and in 
turn shapes the founding conditions of the new ventur . As a result, the heterogeneity in 
founders’ background has an effect on the formation of firms’ alliance ties, research 
output, and performance.  
 The literature on employee and academic entrepreneu ship has looked 
independently at what determines the success of these n w ventures. Firms founded by 
employee entrepreneurs benefit from their founders’ industry experience (Agarwal et al., 
2004; Chatterji, 2009), whereas academically founded firms benefit from having founders 
from prestigious universities (Shane, 2004). Few empirical studies have compared the 
performance of these two types of start-ups (Ensley & Hmieleski, 2005; Wennberg, 
Wiklund, & Wright, 2011; Winston Smith & Shah, 2013) or have examined the role of 
knowledge garnered by the founder’s university education on the firm’s performance 
(Wennberg et al., 2011). This study builds on the prior works by examining how the 
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founders’ backgrounds influence the alliance network, research output, and performance 
of academic and employee start-ups. 
 Employee start-ups are firms founded by individuals who have prior experience in 
the industry, and the prior employer of the employee entrepreneur is the parent firm. 
Academic start-ups are firms founded to commercialize a technology or idea developed 
within an academic institution, which may be a research laboratory or university. I use 
longitudinal data from start-ups in the pharmaceutical and medical device industry from 
1986 to 2013 for this study. I find that employee start-ups are more likely to form alliance 
ties with other firms, and their alliance networks are larger than those of academic start-
ups. However, employee start-ups tend to favor ties that allow them to access research 
and commercialization resources, as compared to academic start-ups that use their 
alliance ties to gain access to funding, marketing, a d manufacturing resources. 
Additionally, academic start-ups are more likely to have a large number of patents. 
Furthermore, the founders’ backgrounds do not determine the firms’ IPO or acquisition. 
These results suggest that the founders’ backgrounds shape the new ventures’ initial 
choices regarding research output and alliance ties. However, the firm outcome results 
suggest that the founders’ influence may be limited to shaping the paths the new ventures 
take, and has no affect on the firms’ survival, IPO, failure, or acquisition. 
 
Research Questions 
 Prior research has established that the founding co ditions have a long-lasting 
effect on the performance of these new ventures. Parent firms are previous employers of 
the founders of employee start-ups. Successful parent fi ms generate successful employee 
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start-ups (Agarwal et. al, 2004), while leading universities generate academic start-ups 
that are more likely to survive (Shane, 2004). Heterog neity between these two types of 
start-ups arises from the process of new venture creation. These differences in their 
founding conditions shape their research output, alliance ties, and performance.  
 Employee start-ups are firms founded by employees of incumbent firms in the 
same industry (Agarwal et al., 2004; Klepper, 2002). Employee entrepreneurs use the 
technical and nontechnical knowledge inherited from their employers (Agarwal et al. 
2004; Chatterji, 2009; Franco & Filson, 2006; Kleppr & Sleeper, 2005). These new 
ventures have complementary assets relevant to the market of entry, since they enter 
markets related to their prior work experience (Phillips, 2002). Their entrepreneurial 
background determines their access to resources, and different founding conditions lead 
to heterogeneity in the knowledge within these new v ntures (Agarwal & Shah, 2014). 
Employee start-ups can leverage their founders’ industry experience to seek alliance 
partners. 
 The industry experience of founders of employee start-ups shapes the knowledge 
within the new venture (Agarwal et al., 2004). Employee entrepreneurs inherit technical 
knowledge through their founders’ pre-entry experience (Agarwal et al., 2004; Chatterji, 
2009; Klepper & Sleeper, 2005) and enter product markets similar to their parents’ 
markets (Phillips, 2002). As a result, these start-ups are endowed with knowledge and 
resources relevant to the market of entry (Helfat & Lieberman), making them better at 
navigating the product market. Furthermore, they also gain nontechnical knowledge 
(Chatterji, 2009; Mitton, 1990; Stuart & Sorenson, 2003a; 2003b) and social capital 
through their founders’ experience (Hallen, 2008; Roberts & Sterling, 2012). 
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Nontechnical knowledge includes downstream activities such as marketing, distribution, 
and overcoming regulatory barriers to commercialize their product. For example, Roberts 
and Sterling (2012) showed that employee start-ups in the Ontario wine industry 
leveraged their founders’ industry experience, and social capital gained through their 
prior employer in the same industry, to create successful new ventures.  
 Employee entrepreneurship literature includes studies in different high-
technology industries that are highly competitive, such as medical, laser, biotechnology, 
and semi-conductors (Chatterji, 2009; Ganco, 2013; Klepper & Sleeper, 2005; Stuart & 
Sorenson, 2003a; 2003b). Because these industries are highly competitive, employee 
entrepreneurs pursue the route of entrepreneurship mostly when they can protect their 
intellectual property through patenting (Ganco, 2013; Klepper & Sleeper, 2005). In these 
industries, technical knowledge plays a crucial role in the success of new firms; thus, new 
ventures use patents to protect their knowledge.  
 Academic start-ups evolve from universities with the intention of 
commercializing intellectual property developed within the university or research 
institution. Technical knowledge plays an important role in creating successful start-ups 
(Shane, 2004), and academic researchers gain this knowledge through their experience in 
academic institutions. Prior research in academic entrepreneurship has focused on start-
ups from one or a few prestigious universities such as the Massachusetts Institute of 
Technology (Shane, 2004), the University of California (Lowe, 2002; Lowe & Zedonis, 
2006), and universities in the United Kingdom (Lockett, Siegel, Wright, & Ensley, 2005; 
Vohora, Wright, & Lockett, 2004). The advantage of using this limited sampling frame 
was that these studies were able to disentangle the ntr preneurial process of firm 
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formation. However, the authors were careful about generalizing these results for two 
reasons. First, these start-ups could be more succesful than average academic start-ups 
due to their superior lineage. Second, the local enviro ment, which may provide better 
availability of resources and opportunities, may have shaped the results of these studies. 
 Academic start-ups’ knowledge is strongly related to the technology they develop 
in academic institutions. Most studies of academic start-ups were conducted in high-
technology industries such as life sciences, biotechnology (Lowe, 2002; Shane, 2004; 
Stuart & Ding, 2006; Stuart, Ozdemir, & Ding, 2007), and science and engineering 
(Lockett & Wright, 2005; Vohora et al., 2004). Knowledge is crucial for success in these 
high-technology industries. However, these start-ups have limited industry experience. 
Their founding conditions endowed them with research- or technology-related resources, 
but their limited industry experience could affect their opportunities to form alliance ties. 
Heterogeneity in Founders’ Background and Endowment of Knowledge 
 New ventures benefit from their founders’ pre-entry experience and knowledge. 
Employee entrepreneurship has focused on this knowledge in terms of technical and 
market know-how related to products and services (Agarwal et. al, 2004; Chatterji, 2009; 
Franco & Filson, 2006; Phillips, 2002). The literature on academic entrepreneurship has 
looked at this knowledge in terms of scientific discovery in academic institutions (Lowe 
& Zedonis, 2006; Shane, 2004). I combine these two literature streams to examine the 
effect of different founders’ backgrounds on the firms’ research output, alliance 
formation, and performance.  
 Employee start-ups are firms founded by employee entrepreneurs in the same 
industry as their parent firms or firms that are thprior employers of their founders. 
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Given the founders’ experience in the same industry, employee start-ups are more likely 
to have relevant resources and knowledge for their market of entry. Employee start-ups 
leverage this technical and nontechnical knowledge to navigate the challenges in the 
market of entry, especially in their search for strategic alliance partners (see chapter 1). 
Academic start-ups are firms founded by academic entrepreneurs to commercialize a 
technology borne of innovation in an academic institution or university. These firms have 
little or no industry experience through their founders and may face difficulties 
navigating their product market and finding strategic alliance partners. In sum, employee 
start-ups are better equipped to deal with product market entry compared with academic 
start-ups. 
Effect of Founders’ Background on Formation of Alliance Ties   
 New ventures need complementary assets and knowledge r levant to the market 
of entry (Helfat & Lieberman, 2002). Inter-organizat onal relationships serve as a means 
for the focal firm to access critical resources outside the firm (Dyer & Singh, 1998). New 
ventures have limited resources, so establishing network ties reduces their risk related to 
firm survival. As a result, a new venture can improve its survival chances by securing 
relationships with key industry players. These network ties give access to knowledge, 
resources, and capabilities from the partners, which compensate for the disadvantage of 
the new venture’s inexperience (Hite & Hesterly, 2001). As a result, forming ties with 
other firms increases the start-up’s chance of survival through increased access to 
complementary resources (Pisano, 1990) and legitimacy, through association with 
successful firms (Baum & Oliver, 1991) and access to the partner firm’s network. 
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 The firm formation process shapes how new ventures go about seeking their 
alliance partners. Employee entrepreneurship portrays this process as formation 
predominantly through disagreements (Klepper, 2002; 2 07), utilization of unexploited 
parent know-how (Agarwal et al., 2004), or imitating parent knowledge (Franco & 
Filson, 2006). This path of firm creation leads to competition between the parent and the 
employee start-up in the same product market, and the competition shapes the new 
venture alliance network (see chapter 1). On the otr hand, academically founded firms 
are created in relatively collaborative environments; the university or academic institution 
fosters the academic start-up’s process of commercializing the innovation. However, the 
start-up’s limited industry experience limits its ability to find alliance partners. 
 Employee start-ups have experience in the same industry as their parents by virtue 
of their founders’ pre-entry experience. Academic entrepreneurs create start-ups to 
develop early-stage research and need complementary assets to develop their technology. 
However, academic start-ups lack the industry experience that employee start-ups have 
through their founders’ backgrounds. One implication of this stark difference in industry 
experience transpires in the form of alliance networks forged by these two start-up types. 
In addition, the differences in the founders’ backgrounds could also drive the types of 
resources they seek. Hence, I explore the different types of resources transferred across 
each tie. 
 Differences in the alliance network size and types of resources can positively 
influence the firm’s performance (Baum, Calabrese, & Silverman, 2000; Lavie, 2007; 
Powell, Koput, & Smith-Doerr, 1996). As firms increase their number of ties, they must 
pay attention to the alliance network composition t avoid redundant ties that provide 
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access to the same information (Burt, 1992) or comple entary capabilities (Gomes-
Cassees, 1994). As the diversity of resources increases, it creates access to different 
resources and creates multiple sources of information for the focal firm. Each tie can 
transfer different types of resources. Therefore, diversity among these resources captures 
the strategic nature of tie formation. Efficient nework composition consists of diverse 
resources (Baum et al., 2000), and this diversity enhances the firm’s performance for two 
reasons. First, it increases the diversity of comple entary resources that the focal firm 
can access. Second, it identifies whether the firm is forging ties that allow access to 
similar resources, and whether every tie increases ccess to new resources. Redundant 
ties could tax the focal firm by adding to the cost f collaboration without the additional 
benefit of accessing diverse, complementary resources. As resource diversity increases, 
the chance of the start-up’s survival improves. Therefore, both the number of ties and the 
different types of resources transferred through these ties are crucial to understanding the 
effect of the founders’ backgrounds on the alliance etwork configuration of these two 
start-up types. In the first question, I examine th propensity to form ties and the alliance 
network characteristics of both start-up types.  
Question 1: Are employee start-ups more likely than academic start-up to aggressively 
seek alliance network ties with other firms? If so, h w do the alliance network 
characteristics of employee start-ups differ from those of academic start-ups? 
Effect of Founders’ Backgrounds on Research Output  
 New ventures are endowed with resources through their founders’ pre-entry 
experience. The resource endowment of a new venture a  its founding is an important 
predictor of the knowledge within the firm and the strategic decisions it will make. These 
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founding conditions have long-lasting effects on the firm’s survival and success (Boeker 
1989; Stinhcombe, 1965). However, because new firms are vulnerable to 
misappropriation of crucial resources by other firms in the industry, patenting would 
protect their knowledge. Additionally, firms with property rights have better bargaining 
positions than do firms that do not have patents. 
 Academically founded firms have research experience through their founders’ 
pre-entry experience. Does this research experience translate into better research output 
than for employee start-ups? Academically founded firms benefit from their affiliation 
with their parent institution and leverage resources within the research institute to pursue 
their own research. Benefits of parent-institution affiliation include access to crucial 
resources such as the research facility, technology-transfer office, and infrastructure. The 
key characteristic of the knowledge pursued by these academic start-ups is that it is for 
novel technologies (Clarysse, Wright, & Van de Velde, 2011). These technologies are 
developed after creation of a new venture (Lowe & Zedonis, 2006). Therefore, the second 
question compares the research output of employee and academic start-ups.  
Question 2: How does the patenting behavior of employee start-ups differ from that of 
academic start-ups?  
Effect of Founders’ Backgrounds on Firm Performance  
 New ventures have limited financial data, and thus firm survival is the most 
commonly used measure to evaluate a start-up’s performance. Employee start-ups have 
relevant industry experience due to their founders’ p e-entry experience. Using 
comprehensive longitudinal data of entrepreneurial fi ms in Sweden, Wennberg et al. 
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(2011) found that firms founded by employee entrepreneurs survived longer than and 
outperformed academic start-ups in terms of growth.  
 Another common measure of firm performance is IPO and acquisitions. 
Academic and employee start-ups are equally likely to go public (Audretsch & Stephan, 
1996). Academic start-ups lack industry experience through their founders’ pre-entry 
affiliation; thus, being acquired is a successful exit. Academic firms are very likely to be 
acquired by established firms (Lowe & Zedonis, 2006), even after IPO (Bonardo, Paleari, 
& Vismara, 2010). 
 Employee start-ups have relevant industry experience, whereas academic start-ups 
have research experience. Both types of new ventures ne d access to the right resources 
at the right time. Employee start-ups can leverage their founders’ pre-entry experience to 
seek partners (chapter 1). Alternatively, they can ge erate patents to protect their 
knowledge. Academically founded firms could excel at this due to their founders’ 
research experience. If the founders’ backgrounds shape the research output and alliance 
ties of employee and academic start-ups, then does this influence extend to firm 
outcome? Firm outcome is captured as firm survival, IPO, acquisition, or failure. A better 
measure of firm performance is the detailed financil data of a firm’s income and gross 
profit. However, only limited financial data is available for new ventures. Therefore, firm 
outcome is a good way to evaluate their performance. Hence, the final question that I 
examine is:  
Question 3: How do employee start-ups perform relative to academic start-ups?  
 
 56
Data and Methods 
Empirical Context 
 The pharmaceutical and medical device industry is a good empirical context to 
compare and contrast employee start-ups with academic start-ups for two reasons. First, 
this industry is highly competitive. Firms need both technology and alliance ties with 
other firms to be successful in this industry. Second, pharmaceuticals and medical 
devices are heavily regulated, making commercialization of the technology extremely 
challenging and expensive. One common way to deal with this competition is to form 
alliance ties with other firms to aid their research, ommercialization, and marketing 
processes. Hence, both patents and alliance networks are essential features of their 
survival strategy and success, making this industry an ideal context to examine employee 
and academic start-ups. 
 Comparing employee start-ups with academics start-ups is extremely challenging 
because of the limited information available about the founding conditions of new firms. 
I deal with this challenge by developing a unique database, created by digitizing Medical 
Marketplace guides from 1986 to 2003. I use this Medical Marketplace database to 
identify the start-ups’ origins and then construct a unique longitudinal dataset from 1986 
to 2013 by combining data from different databases.  
 There are four key parts to the data collected: firm ounding, patent information, 
alliance network, and financial data. First, information regarding the founders’ 
backgrounds enables me to identify if an academic or an employee entrepreneur created 
the start-up. I use data from the Medical Marketplace database, along with data from 
LexisNexis and ThompsonOne, to establish the founding conditions of all the start-ups. I 
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initially identify all 2,549 firms founded after 1986 from the Medical Marketplace 
database. I then track the founding team or information about the founding conditions.   
 New ventures are defined as employee start-ups when an incumbent firm in the 
industry previously employed a member of the new firm’s top management team. During 
this classification process, I consider the employment history of the top management 
team only within five years of founding year for two reasons. First, the founder 
determines the top management team composition within its initial years of existence 
(Beckman & Burton, 2008). Moreover, in this industry, he core structure of the start-up’s 
top management team usually remains the same for the first five years. Second, some 
firms were reported in these guides after five years from their founding date. Small firms 
are difficult to track, and few firms are tracked five years after their creation. In addition, 
the history of the firm is reported in detail, but the top management team is reported only 
for the current year. Most of the top management team has founders making this data 
very reliable. I also track the history of top management teams using ThompsonOne and 
LexisNexis database to identify employee start-ups.  
 Academic start-ups are firms founded to commercialize a technology developed 
within any research institution. I identify academic start-ups through the description of 
the firms’ founding conditions and include all the firms founded by academic scientists or 
established to commercialize a technology developed within a research institute (e.g., a 
university or research organization). The final data contains 173 academic start-ups and 
145 employee start-ups.  
 The second part of the data is related to innovatin within the start-up and is 
captured by patent data collected from the Delphion database. The third component of the 
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dataset is the alliance networks established by these start-ups. I use the Medical 
Marketplace database, SEC Filings, and LexisNexis to recover the alliance history for 
each start-up. Finally, I collect financial data from the Medical Marketplace database, 
SEC filings, COMPUSTAT, and additional firm-level characteristics like firm age, 
number of employees, location, and firm history from the Medical Marketplace database. 
Variables 
 I test the above questions regarding the effect of the ounders’ backgrounds on the 
performance of start-ups using the data on employee and academic start-ups in the 
pharmaceutical and medical device industry. I analyze the effect of the founder’ 
backgrounds on the research output, alliance network configuration, and firm outcome in 
terms of survival, IPO, failure, and acquisition.  
Dependent and Independent Variables.  
 The key dependent variables are research output, alliance network configuration, 
and firm outcome. I capture the start-up’s research output using patent data collected 
from the Delphion database. I measure the propensity to have patents using a dummy 
variable that takes a value of 1 when the firm has at least one patent at any time and a 
value of 0 otherwise. I also capture the quantity and quality of patents using the number 
of patents and the average citation of these patents, respectively. The patents quantity is 
measured using the total number of patents every year and the cumulative number of 
patents across all years. The average number of citations is captured as an average across 
all years and the five-year average citation is measured as the average number of citations 
within five years after the patent is granted.  
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 The second set of dependent variables captures the alliance network configuration 
by measuring the total number of ties and resources t an ferred across each tie. The data 
on alliance ties is gathered from the Medical Marketplace database, LexisNexis, and SEC 
filings. I capture the propensity to form alliance ties with a dummy variable that has a 
value of 1 if the start-up had at least one alliance tie and a value of 0 otherwise.  
 To understand further how these start-ups leverage their alliance ties to gain 
access to different resources and partners, I create different measures to capture 
characteristics of the alliance network. The first characteristic is the size of the network, 
measured by the total number of ties. For the average number of resources transferred 
across each tie, I use four categories of resources: commercial, research, marketing or 
manufacturing, and funding. I measure the average number of resources transferred 
across each tie forged to capture the strength of a tie, because a firm with stronger 
alliance ties can access a greater variety of resouces. I also measure the number of ties 
that transfer three specific types of resources: research, commercial, and marketing or 
funding. Each tie could transfer more than one resource; hence, the resource count does 
not directly match the number of ties. The research resource captures research and 
development, clinical trials, and anything related to technology development. The 
commercial resource captures commercialization, licensing, and regulatory related 
resources. The marketing and funding resources include marketing, sales, manufacturing, 
and funding-related resources. I then measure the diversity among the resources or 
partners in the new ventures’ alliance networks, since having the same number of alliance 
ties does not mean the alliance network is structurally equivalent.  
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 The concept of “structural equivalence” (Burt, 1992), wherein firms participating 
in similar businesses are considered homogenous in terms of skills, ties, and assets, has 
been used to justify the assumption that similar firms transfer similar resources across 
ties. Another implication of structural equivalence is that all resources between firms that 
form ties are readily accessible to both firms. This is not usually the case in the 
pharmaceutical and medical device industry, where pat nt rights are heavily protected 
and firms may work together on research projects. Hence, to understand which resources 
are being transferred across these ties and the differences across the partners, I create 
diversity measures related to the types of resources and partners.  
 The first measure relates to partner diversity. I use a Herfindahl index to measure 
the heterogeneity of partners. Partner diversity captures the extent to which the start-up 
can find diverse partners. In this study, the different types of alliance partners are 
universities, research labs, government intuitions, ho pitals, and firms. I define partner 
diversity5 as 
#?@(A$@B$@C(D  1 < E ##

 /F 
where PPij is the proportion of resources received by start-up i through its alliance with 
partner j, and NT is start-up i’s total number of alliance ties to other firms. This value 
ranges from 0 to 1, and higher values indicate greate  heterogeneity among the alliance 
partners.  
                                                
5. The partner diversity measure is captured as network efficiency, or how efficient the start-up’s 
network is (Baum et. al, 2000). In this paper, both diversity measures merely capture the heterogeneity of 
resources or partners in a network. 
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 The second measure is resource diversity, which captures the heterogeneity of 
resources transferred across each network tie, ranging from research to 
commercialization. The different types of resources are research, commercialization, 
manufacturing, marketing, and funding. This indicator measures which resources are 
transferred across all the ties that the focal firmc eates. For example, a firm may invest in 
ten ties to gain access to research resources of the partner firms, or it may use four ties to 
access research resources and six ties to access marketing resources. The Medical 
Marketplace database allows me to examine all the resources transferred across the ties 
and to compute the diversity measure for the alliance network. Resource diversity is 
calculated using a Herfindahl index that varies from 0 to 1. A value of 1 indicates that the 
firm gains access to a diverse set of resources, whereas 0 indicates that the firm gains 
access to one type of resource. Higher values indicate more heterogeneity of resources. 
Resource diversity is measured as 
$CGH@I$B$@C(D  1 < E #

 /F 
where PRij is the proportion of resources received by start-up i through its alliance with 
partners j, and NT is start-up i’s total number of alliance ties to other firms. These two 
measures capture different types of diversity among types of partners and resources. 
 The final dependent variable, firmOutcome, captures th  firm’s outcome: 
survival, acquisition, IPO, or failure. This variable measures the economic performance 
of the start-up using firm outcomes rather than financial indicators such as net income or 
sales. Using firm outcome to capture start-up performance is standard practice in the 
literature (Chatterji, 2009), due to limited financial data available for small firms. The 
firm outcome data is consolidated using information fr m COMPUSTAT, the Medical 
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Marketplace database, SEC filings, and ventureXpert databases. I have limited financial 
data, such as gross profits, for some firms, and I i clude an analysis for this subsample in 
Tables 8 and 9. The skepticism associated with doing these regressions on gross profits, 
net income, and net sales is that this subsample includes start-ups that were relatively 
more successful.  
 The key independent variable is the start-up dummy that identifies whether the 
firm is an employee (value 1) or an academic (value 0) start-up.  
Control Variables.  
 The control variables are the number of employees, total number of patents, total 
number of ties, firm age, and resource and partner div rsity measures. Firm age is the 
number of years elapsed since the start-up’s founding year. I control for firm age because 
new ventures’ focus on technology and capability are expected to increase with time. The 
data comes from the Medical Marketplace database, which provides extensive 
information about how these start-ups are created. I also control for firm size by using the 
number of employees in the start-up every year. Bigger firms have more resources to 
devote to innovation and product commercialization, and thus perform better.  
 Firm location could allow them to access resources pr ent in their local economy 
due to geographic agglomeration of firms within the same industry. As a result, being 
closer to countries with more innovation activities n the pharmaceutical and medical 
device industry may provide some benefits. Additionally, every country has its own 
regulations, and variations in these regulations may affect the start-up’s performance. All 
variables and their definitions are listed in Table 8. 
− − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − 
Insert Table 8 (List of variables) here 
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− − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − 
 
Results and Discussion 
Alliance Network Configuration 
 Employee start-ups have relevant industry experience, and they leverage this 
experience to seek alliance partners (chapter 1). Academic start-ups have limited industry 
experience, curtailing their opportunities to form alliance ties. The relevant industry 
experience of employee entrepreneurs could shape mor  than just alliance ties of these 
firms. More importantly, it could affect the types of products that these start-ups pursue. 
In this study, I focus only on alliance ties, as there is no consistent product-level data for 
these start-ups. There are three key issues with collecting such data. The first is that the 
FDA database captures only products approved in the Unit d States. However, the new 
ventures in this study were from all parts of the world, making it challenging to collect 
detailed product-level data for all the firms. The second issue is that most firms listed 
only their latest product. The concern is that the first product introduced by this firm may 
not have shown up when I searched the FDA or company website for information. Third, 
the level of detail for each product may vary based on its importance to the firm, and 
there could be no consistent way to classify them. Therefore, I stuck to alliance network 
ties established by these firms as a way to capture how these new ventures leverage their 
founders’ pre-entry experience in their markets of entry. 
 Founders affect the way start-ups forge their alliance networks. First, I examine 
the propensity of employee and academic start-ups to form at least one tie. I estimate the 
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probability of establishing at least one tie using lo istic regression. Table 9 shows that 
employee start-ups have a higher propensity to formalliances than do academic start-ups. 
Clearly, employee start-ups are eager to leverage their relevant industry experience to 
forge ties with other firms. If so, what sort of alli nce ties do employee start-ups forge, 
compared with academic start-ups?  
− − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − 
Table 9 (Propensity to Form Alliances) here 
− − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − 
 The next set of analyses digs deeper into the alliance network composition by 
examining the size of the alliance network and the resources transferred across these ties. 
Figure 4 clearly shows that there is a stark difference between the alliance networks 
forged by employee start-ups and academic start-ups. I capture the size of the alliance 
network by the total number of ties across all years. The second measure of alliance 
network characteristics is the average number of resources transferred across each tie the 
start-up formed. The measure of resources transferred across these ties is resource 
diversity, which captures different types of resources transferred across all ties. 
Additionally, I capture the heterogeneity among alliance partners using the partner 
diversity measure. I use random effects models for all these regressions. The key 
independent variable, start-up type, is time invariant; therefore, a random effects model is 
a better specification than a fixed effects model. The sign and significance of coefficients 
did not change between random effects and the firm fixed effects regression. However, a 
random effect is the better specification, as supported by the Hausman specification test. 
 
− − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − 
Insert Figure 4 (Number of Alliance) here 
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− − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − 
 Table 10 shows the estimated effect of the type of start-up on the network of the 
new venture. The dependent variables for this analysis are the total number of ties, the 
average number of resources transferred across each ti , resource diversity, and partner 
diversity (columns 1-4, respectively). I find that employee start-ups have larger networks 
than academic start-ups (column 1). I then examine the characteristics of these networks 
(columns 2-4). On average, employee start-ups gain access to more resources per tie 
(column 2) and have lower resource and partner diversity than do academic start-ups 
(columns 3-4). Although employee start-ups may access more resources with each tie, 
their overall network gains access to fewer types of resources and partners. Does this 
imply that employee and academic start-ups seek different types of resources?  
 
− − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − 
Insert Table 10 (Alliance Characteristics) here 
− − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − 
 To understand why employee start-ups have lower resource diversity but higher 
average number of resources transferred across each ti  than do academic start-ups, I 
examine which resources were transferred across thee ties (Table 11). I group these 
resources into three categories: research, commercial, and marketing or funding ties. The 
dependent variables are the number of research, commercial, and marketing or funding 
ties (columns 1-3). The results suggest that employee start-ups are more likely to pursue 
research and commercialization resources, whereas academic start-ups are more likely to 
pursue marketing and funding resources. Furthermore, the availability of patents 
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decreases the start-ups’ propensity to pursue research resources and increases their 
propensity to pursue commercial, marketing, and funing resources.  
 
− − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − 
Insert Table 11 (Resource Transferred) here 
− − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − 
 
 The propensity of employee entrepreneurs to form research ties supports the 
conjecture that these firms lack the research experience of academically founded firms. 
As a result, they seek out research resources to bolster their technological resources. 
Furthermore, they seek commercialization resources through their alliance ties. 
Conversely, academic start-ups lack commercialization resources, so forming alliance 
ties is a way to access these resources. However, academic start-ups may have less 
opportunity to form such ties than employee start-ups that can leverage their founders’ 
pre-entry experience to seek alliance partners (chapter 1). Instead, academic start-ups 
form marketing, manufacturing, and funding ties. In sum, these results suggest that 
employee start-ups are able to navigate the market better than academic start-ups due to 
their founders’ prior industry experience. In this case, employee start-ups are savvy in 
seeking out alliance partners and seem to fare bettr than do academic start-ups.  
Research Output 
 Academic start-ups are created to commercialize a technology or innovation 
already developed within a university or academic institution. On the other hand, 
founders who want to pursue their ideas outside their current employment create 
employee start-ups. The subtle difference in the creation process could have a strong 
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influence on the research output of these new ventur s. I use patents to measure research 
output, since this captures the technological resources across both types of start-ups. 
Publications are another form of research output for academic start-ups, but not for 
employee start-ups. Therefore, I use patents to measur  research output for both academic 
and employee start-ups. Research output is measured using three dependent variables: the 
firm has at least one patent, the total number of patents, and the average citations of these 
patents. 
 The first set of analyses examines the propensity of the firm to file for at least one 
patent and using logistic regression. Academic start-ups have extensive research 
experience due to their founders’ prior employment at the academic institution where the 
technology was developed. When these firms are created, they file for patents to protect 
their competitive advantage—the technology developed at the academic institution. 
Employee start-ups do not have the flexibility to develop their technology using their 
parent firms’ resources. As a result, they need to conduct the research upon creation of 
the new venture. These mechanisms are supported by the results displayed in Table 12, 
which shows that employee start-ups seem to have a lower propensity to file for patents. 
This suggests that academic start-ups are indeed more research productive than are 
employee start-ups, when patents capture research productivity. 
 
− − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − 
Insert Table 12 (Propensity to Patent) here 




 The next question examines the volume and quality of patents of these two types 
of start-ups. All regressions are random effect models, as the key independent variable, 
start-up type, is time invariant. Results from both the random effects and firm fixed 
effects models have coefficients with similar sign and significance. Furthermore, the 
Hausman specification test shows that a random effects model is the better specification. 
The volume of patents filed by employee start-ups is considerably lower than by 
academic start-ups. The volume of patents is measurd as the total number of patents held 
by the firm, and the total number of patents granted every year, as shown in columns 1 
and 2, respectively, of Table 13. Both columns show that employee start-ups have far 
fewer patents compared to academic start-ups. Furthermore, having alliance ties to other 
firms increases the number of patents held by these start-ups. Columns 3 and 4 show the 
results of examining whether employee start-ups have higher quality patents. I measure 
patent quality using the average citation these patnts received across all years and in a 
five-year window. According to this measure, the patents of employee start-ups are of 
lower quality than those of academic start-ups. 
 
− − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − 
Insert Table 13 (Patents- Quantity and Quality) here 
− − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − 
 
Firm Outcome: Survival, Acquisition, IPO, or Failure 
 Academic start-ups have additional research experience, but limited industry 
experience compared to employee start-ups. The limited industry experience of 
academically founded firms could have a detrimental effect on their survival and 
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performance, whereas their additional research experience could endow them with 
technological resources crucial to their success and survival. On the other hand, employee 
start-ups can leverage their relevant industry experience to navigate the product market 
and succeed. Does this industry experience translate to better success and survival for 
employee start-ups? I measure the firm outcome of these start-ups using the multi-value 
dummy, firmOutcome, which takes values 0 to 3 for the firm’s failure, IPO, acquisition, 
and survival, respectively.The base outcome for, in the dependent variable the 
multinomial logit is firm survival. The results of this regression are shown in Table 14.  
 
− − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − 
Insert Table 14 (Firm Outcomes) here 
− − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − 
 
 Table 14 shows the results of two multinomial logistic regressions. Columns 1-3 
show the results of the first multinomial logit, wherein one of the independent variables is 
the average number of resources transferred across each tie. The second multinomial logit 
results, tabulated in columns 4 and 5, include resource diversity as one of its independent 
variable. The average number of resources transferred across each tie captures the 
strength of each tie, whereas the diversity measure includes the different types of 
resources that a start-up gains access to through network ties. The multinomial logistic 
regression results for columns 1 and 4 suggest that employee start-ups are less likely to 
fail than academic start-ups. The coefficients of the employee start-up dummy for IPO 
and acquisition were not significant. The characteris ics of ties, such as the strength of 
ties and diversity of resources, have a stronger eff ct on firm outcome than does just the 
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start-up origin. The average number of resources transferred across each tie, and resource 
diversity have a negative effect on firm failure, IPO, or acquisition, as shown in columns 
1-6.  
 I run additional analyses using gross profits, net i come, and net sales as the 
dependent variables (Tables 15 and 16). The results in Table 15 suggest that employee 
start-ups are likely to make lower profit (column 1) and income (column 3) compared to 
academic start-ups. However, these results did not hold when I control for firm 
heterogeneity using firm fixed effects (Table 16). Financial data is available for start-ups 
that were relatively successful and report their performance. Thus, I cannot interpret these 
findings as definitive evidence. Hence, I conclude that firm outcomes are a good 
representation of firm performance. Table 17 and Figure 5 show the survival functions of 
both types of start-ups going public (i.e., IPO). This only looked at firms’ IPOs and use 
Breslow’s approximation for the hazard function. The results suggest that employee start-
ups are more likely than academic start-ups to go public. However, the results can be best 
interpreted when all the alternative outcomes are considered in competing risk models. 
Such estimation needs data like the time of firm acquisition or bankruptcy, which would 
entail further data collection. Hence, only the event history analysis of firm IPO is 
included in this study for now. Overall, I find tha the founders’ backgrounds have little 
or no impact on firm performance. 
− − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − 
Insert Figure 5 (Survival function) here 
− − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − 
− − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − 
Insert Table 15 (OLS Regression) here 
− − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − 
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− − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − 
Insert Table 16 (Firm FE Regression) here 
− − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − 
− − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − 
Insert Table 17 (Cox Model) here 
− − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − − 
 
Conclusions 
 This chapter set out to study the differential impact of start-up founders’ 
background on the formation of alliance ties, research output, and firm performance of 
employee and academic start-ups. The academic start-up has better research resources by 
virtue of its founder’s experience in the research institution. On the other hand, the 
employee start-up has relevant industry experience, allowing it to deal with a highly 
competitive environment. I find that academic start-ups have a higher research output 
compared with employee start-ups. This finding supports the proposition that academic 
founders endow the start-up with better research resources than employee startups. 
Additionally, compared to academic start-ups, employee start-ups are more prolific in 
forming alliance ties with other firms. This finding lends supports to the inference that 
the employee start-ups benefit from their founders’ industry experience.  
 The alliance network composition of these start-ups suggests that employee start-
ups leverage their industry experience to forge ties with other firms. However, they lack 
the research experience that academic start-ups have and thus seek research or 
commercial ties with other firms. Academic start-ups have research experience but 
limited industry experience. This would indicate that they would seek commercialization 
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resources. However, their lack of relevant industry experience proves detrimental to their 
ability to seek commercial ties. Instead, they form marketing, manufacturing, and funding 
ties with other firms. Research experience of the academic start-ups has a positive impact 
on the volume of patents they generate. Furthermore, these start-ups produce higher 
quality patents than do employee start-ups. 
 The effect of the founders’ backgrounds on firm performance is not as evident, 
suggesting that the founders’ pre-entry experience shapes their preliminary choices, such 
as patents and alliance ties. However, heterogeneity i  the founder’s background does not 
completely determine a start-up’s success or failure. This result contradicts prior research 
that compared employee and academic start-ups to find that employee start-ups fared 
better in industry (Wennberg et al., 2011) due to their founders’ pre-entry experience.  
 The founders’ backgrounds may not have any impact on the start-ups’ 
performance for two reasons. First, prior studies did not look at both technology and 
alliance ties to examine the effect of founders’ backgrounds on firm performance. The 
founders’ backgrounds may shape initial choices related to technology and alliance 
network, but their pre-entry experience may have no bearing on firm performance. 
Examining the paths traversed by these new ventures, instead of comparing their 
performance, may have driven the results in the previous studies.  
 Second, the sampling frames of this study differed f om earlier studies. Prior 
studies compared employee and academic start-ups using different sampling contexts, 
such as start-ups in Sweden (Wennberg et al., 2011) or start-ups from three southeastern 
U.S. universities matched with non-university start-ups (Ensley & Hmieleski, 2005). 
Instead, in this study I compare start-ups in the parmaceutical and medical device 
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industry from the United States, Europe, and Asia. Furthermore, I sample the employee 
and academic start-ups from the Medical Marketplace database. These different sampling 
frames could create some limitations when directly omparing the studies. However, the 
non-result is an interesting finding, as it suggests that the founders’ backgrounds shape 
the paths traversed by these start-ups but do not determine firm performance.  
 These results have implications for both theory and practice. With respect to 
theory, this study adds to the understanding of howfounders could leave an imprint on 
the alliance network and research output of these nw ventures. However, differences in 
founders’ pre-entry experience do not affect the firm performance. In practice, 
entrepreneurs could learn how to leverage their experience to benefit the firms’ 
knowledge and network. Furthermore, this study encourages founders to focus on 
imminent strategic decisions pertaining to knowledge creation and potential alliance 
partners. Founders can leverage their experience to fulfill their resource needs by either 
developing or patenting the knowledge within the firm. Alternatively, they can fulfill the 
need for these resources by forming alliance ties. These strategic decisions, rather than 
the lack of resources at its founding, seem to shape the firm’s outcome. In conclusion, the 
founder’s background does not determine firm performance. Instead, it just shapes the 
















Figure 1. Spinout Categories based on Technological nd Market Distance from 
their Parent 
This figure shows the categorization of spinouts baed on the technological and market distance 
relative to their parents. Each quadrant explains how the spinout applies the knowledge it 
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This figure shows the three types of partner firms based on their network relationships with the 
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Table 1. Variables Definitions 
Variable Definition 
Dependent Variables  
Parent alliance network Firms that have direct or indirect ties to the  parent firm 
Partner type Firms with direct ties to the parent or are the parent’s 
partners, or firms with indirect ties to the parent through 
a tie to a parent’s partner  
Resource type Resource transferred across a tie, such a  research, 
commercial, manufacturing, or marketing.  
Independent Variables (by Spinout Type)  
Low Market and Low Tech Distance Spinouts with low technological and market distances 
from their parents 
High Market and High Tech Distance Spinouts with high technological and market distances 
from their parents 
High Market and Low Tech Distance Spinouts with high technological and low market 
distance from their parents 
Low Market and Low Tech Distance Spinouts with low technological and low market 
distance from their parent 
Control Variables  
Total ties  Number of ties formed by spinout, parent, and partner 
firms as of 2012 
Location Address of the parent, partner, and spinout; used to 
create dummies for the countries  
Spinout age Number of years since its founding date
Spinout size Number of employees within a firm 
Patent Number of patents or patent dummy for spinout, parent, 
and partner s 




Table 2. Descriptive Statistics and Correlation Matrix 
Variables Mean SD Min  Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1. Spinout: 
MLow & TLow 0.571 0.495 0 1 1 
2. Spinout: 
MHigh & THigh 0.058 0.233 0 1 -0.29 1 
3. Spinout: 
MLow & THigh 0.246 0.431 0 1 -0.66 -0.14 1 
4. Spinout: 
MHigh & TLow 0.117 0.322 0 1 -0.42 -0.09 -0.21 1 
5. Firm Age 22.028 7.513 4 109 0.14 -0.09 0.01 -0.16 1 
6. #Employees 406.842 1421.955 2 13000 0.06 -0.03 -0.01 -0.05 0.18 1 
7. # Patents 48.417 88.437 0 500 -0.09 0.08 0.11 -0.05 -0.02 0.21 1 
8. Spinout 
Betweenness 
Centrality 13937.574 30928.149 0 2.78E+05 0.07 0.08 -0.11 -0.02 0 0.27 0.33 1 
 
This table lists the mean, standard deviation, and minimum and maximum values, along with 
correlations for all variables, in columns 1-8. Columns 1-8 are variables listed in the first column 






Table 3. ERGM Estimation of Formation of Alliances Ties by Spinouts 
Variable Estimate 
Spinout: MLow & TLow 0.634***     (0.483) 
Spinout: MLow & THigh -0.143***     (0.175) 
Spinout: MHigh & THigh 0.362***    (0.413) 
Parent Direct Partner -0.562***    (1.096) 
Parent Indirect Partner -0.980***    (1.641) 
Nonparent Network -4.446***    (1.641) 
Spinout: MLow & TLow  *Parent Direct Partner -0.132***    (0.360) 
Spinout: MLow & TLow  *Parent Indirect Partner 0.109***     (0.201) 
Spinout: MLow & TLow  *Nonparent Network 0.690***     (0.309) 
Spinout: MLow & THigh  *Parent Direct Partner 1.005***    (0.219) 
Spinout: MLow & THigh  *Parent Indirect Partner -0.547***    (0.311) 
Spinout: MLow & THigh  *Nonparent Network 0.0791***    (0.506) 
Spinout: MHigh & THigh  *Parent Direct Partner 0.413***      (0.413) 
Spinout: MHigh & THigh  *Parent Indirect Partner 0.777***      (0.370) 
Spinout: MHigh & THigh  *Nonparent Network -0.348***     (0.175) 
Degree Centrality 0.0033***     (0.002) 
Country US 0.197***      (0.127) 
This table tabulates the results of the ERGM estimation with 100,000 iterations for 1,182 firms 
(N= 1182). These firms include spinouts, parents, and partners. The ERGM estimation accounts 
for network and characteristics of all the firms while predicting the formation of alliance ties. The 
M and T in the spinout categories represent product market and technological distance. The 
excluded category has spinouts with high market distance and low technological distance. 
Notes. Standard errors in parentheses 
*p < 0.05 
** p < 0.01 






Table 4. Resource Transfer across Ties—Firms with Direct or Indirect Parent Ties 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Research Commercial Marketing & Funding 































































Observations 7,585 7,585 7,585 
ll -1651.450 -1651.450 -1651.450 
df_m 22.000 22.000 22.000 
aic 3352.900 3352.900 3352.900 
bic 3526.248 3526.248 3526.248 
The dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for a research tie, 2 for a 
commercial tie, 3 for a manufacturing, marketing, or funding tie, and 0 otherwise. Columns (1), 
(2), and (3) tabulate the results of multinomial logistic regression for the propensity to form ties 
to access research, commercial, or marketing and funding resources. Marketing and funding 
represents manufacturing, marketing, and funding resources. The M and T in the spinout category 
represent product market and technological distance, respectively. This estimation is for a sample 
of partners with direct or indirect ties to their parents. 
Notes. Standard errors in parentheses 
*p < 0.05 
** p < 0.01 




Table 5. Resources Transfer across Ties to Firms with No Parent Ties 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Research Commercial Marketing & Funding 































































Observations 724,635 724,635 724,635 
ll -1.35e+04 -1.35e+04 -1.35e+04 
df_m 24.000 24.000 24.000 
aic 27023.059 27023.059 27023.059 
bic 27333.382 27333.382 27333.382 
The dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for research ties; 2 
for commercial ties; 3 for manufacturing, marketing, or funding ties; and 0 otherwise. 
Columns (1), (2), and (3) tabulate the results of multinomial logistic regression for the 
propensity to form ties to access research, commercial, or marketing and funding 
resources. The marketing and funding represents manufacturing, marketing, and funding 
resources. The M and T in the spinout categories repres nt product market and 
technological distance, respectively. This estimation is for a sample of partners with no 
parent ties. 
Notes. Standard errors in parentheses 
*p < 0.05 
** p < 0.01 
*** p < 0.001  
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Table 6. Spinout Partner Choice among Firms with Direct, Indirect, or No Ties to 
the Parent (Multinomial Logit), Excluding M High & T Low 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Direct Indirect Nonparent 































































Observations 732,220 732,220 732,220 
ll -5.73e+04 -5.73e+04 -5.73e+04 
df_m 24.000 24.000 24.000 
aic 1.15e+05 1.15e+05 1.15e+05 
bic 1.15e+05 1.15e+05 1.15e+05 
The dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for firms with direct ties to 
the parent firm, 2 for firms with indirect ties to parents, 3 for firms outside the parent network, 
and 0 otherwise. Columns (1), (2), and (3) tabulate the results of multinomial logistic regression 
for the propensity to form ties to firms with direct, indirect, and no ties to their parent firms. The 
M and T in the spinout categories represent product market and technological distance, 
respectively. The excluded spinout category is firms that have low technological and high market 
distance from their parents. 
Notes. Standard errors in parentheses 
*p < 0.05 
** p < 0.01 




Table 7. Spinout Partner Choice among Firms with Direct, Indirect, or No Ties to 
the Parent (Multinomial Logit), Excluding M Low & T Low 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 Direct Indirect Nonparent 































































Observations 732,220 732,220 732,220 
ll -5.73e+04 -5.73e+04 -5.73e+04 
df_m 24.000 24.000 24.000 
aic 1.15e+05 1.15e+05 1.15e+05 
bic 1.15e+05 1.15e+05 1.15e+05 
The dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for firms with direct ties to 
the parent firm, 2 for firms with indirect ties to the parent, 3 for firms outside the parent network, 
and 0 otherwise. Columns (1), (2), and (3) tabulate the results of multinomial logistic regression 
for the propensity to form ties to firms with direct, indirect, and no ties to their parent firms. The 
M and T in the spinout categories represent product market and technological distance, 
respectively. The excluded spinout category is firms that have low market and low technological 
distance from their parents. 
Notes. Standard errors in parentheses 
*p < 0.05 
** p < 0.01 
*** p < 0.001 
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Table 8. List of Variables, Their Definitions, and What They Measure 
Variable Definition Measures 
Dependent Variables 
Has alliance ties 
(Dummy variables) 
Dummy, captures if the firm has at least one 
alliance 
Propensity to form alliance ties 
#Ties Total number of ties forged by the start-up Size of their alliance  
Resource diversity Herfindahl index type measure, captures types of 
resources transferred across all ties 
Heterogeneity among resources 
access through alliance network 
Partner diversity Herfindahl index type measure, captures types of 
alliance partners 
Heterogeneity among alliance 
partners 
#Research ties Number of ties used to access research resources Propensity to seek research 
resources 
#Commercial ties Number of ties used to access commercialization 
resources 




Number of ties used to access marketing, 
manufacturing, and funding resources 
Propensity to seek marketing, 
manufacturing, and funding 
resources 
Has patent Dummy, captures if the firm has a patent Propensity to patent 
#Patents every year Number of patents granted to the firm every year Research output every year 
#Patents Total number of patents Overall research output 
Avg #Citations  Average number of patent citations , all years Quality of patents in the start-up 
Avg #Citations     
(5-year) 
Average number of patent citations in 5 years Quality of patents in the start-up 
Gross profit, Net 
sales, Net income 
Profit, net sales, and net income made by the 
start-up - data is available only for a sub-sample 
Firm performance measured using 
financial data 
Firm outcome  
If the firm survives, fails, is acquired, or goes IPO Firm performance measured by 
outcome 
Independent Variable 
Start-up type Dummy, captures if firm is an academic or 
employee start-up 
Heterogeneity of founders’ 
background 
Control Variables 
Firm age Number of years since the firm’s founding Years of experience 
Firm location Dummy, captures if firm is located in Asia 
(includes Australia), North America, or Europe 
Location could shape opportunities 










This graph shows the difference between the ties forged by academic start-ups and those forged by 
employee start-ups. The blue line represents the number of start-ups created every year and stops at 2003






Table 9. Start-up Propensity to Form Alliance (Logit) 






















This is a logistic regression where the dependent variable is a dummy that takes the value 1 if the start-up 
has at least one alliance tie to other firms, and the value 0 otherwise. 
Notes. Standard errors in parentheses 
*p < .05 
** p < .01 






Table 10. Start-up Alliance Network Characteristics (Random Effects) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 # Ties 
Average # 









































































3,105 3,105 3,105 3,105 
All regressions of random effects, where the dependent variables from column 1-4 are number of ties, 
average number of resources transferred across each ti , resource diversity, and partner diversity  
Notes. Standard errors in parentheses 
*p < .05 
** p < .01 






Table 11. Resources Transferred through Alliance Ties (Random Effects) 
 (1) (2) (3) 











































Observations 3,105 3,105 3,105 
All regressions of random effects, where the dependent variables from column 1-3 are number of research, 
commercial, and marketing/funding ties  
Notes. Standard errors in parentheses 
*p < .05 
** p < .01 





























This is a logistic regression where the dependent variable is a dummy that takes the value 1 if the start-up 
has at least one patent and the value 0, otherwise. 
Notes. Standard errors in parentheses 
*p < .05 
** p < .01 





Table 13. Volume and Quality of Patents within Start-ups (Random Effects) 




























































Observations 3,105 3,105 3,105 3,105 
Tabulation of all random effects regression; the dependent variables are total number of patents, number of 
patents every year, average citations per patent, and average citation in a 5-year window for the start-up  
 
Notes. Standard errors in parentheses 
*p < .05 
** p < .01 





Table 14. Firm Outcomes of Employee and Academic Start-ups (MLogit) 
 (1) (2) (3)  (4) (5) (6) 











































































      



















Observations 3,105 3,105 3,105  3,105 3,105 3,105 
All regressions of multinomial logistic regressions, where the dependent variable is a dummy that takes 
values from 0-3 for firm failure, IPO, acquisition, and survival; the base outcome for the two multinomial 
logit is firm survival. Columns 1-3 and 4-6 have average number of resources transferred across each ti  
and resource diversity as their independent variables, respectively. The results in columns 1-3 are one set of 
multinomial logistic regression, where one of the independent variables is average number of resources 
transferred across each tie. The results in columns 4-6 are the other set of multinomial logistic regression, 
where the independent variable is resource diversity. 
Notes. Standard errors in parentheses 
*p < .05 
** p < .01 









Table 15. OLS Regression of Start-up Performance 
 (1) (2) (3) 



















































Observations 2,430 2,430 2,430 
R2 0.0216 0.0218 0.0178 
The above regressions are OLS estimation of firm gross profits, net sales, and net income.  
Notes. Standard errors in parentheses 
*p < .05 
** p < .01 







Table 16. Firm Fixed Effects Regression of Start-up Performance 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Gross Profit (Loss) Sales/Turnover (Net) Net Income (Loss) 











































Observations 2,430 2,430 2,430 
R2 0.0475 0.0657 0.0232 
The above regressions are firm fixed effects estimations of firm gross profits, net sales, and net income.  
Notes. Standard errors in parentheses 
*p < .05 
** p < .01 







Figure 5. Survival Function for Start-ups Going Public 
 
 
These survival functions show the KM survival estimate curves for employee and academic start-ups for 



























This is a Cox model estimating the event of an IPO using Breslow’s approximation. The Wilcoxon test for 
equality of survival curves suggests that the Breslow’s approximation is a better specification.  
Notes. Standard errors in parentheses 
*p < .05 
** p < .01 
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